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Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the 
Fruit of the Tree in its Proper Season 
ERIC D. CHASON* 
Executive pensions (or deferred compensation) grabbed headlines after 
Enron 's collapse and fresh concerns over ever-increasing executive pay. 
They also grabbed the attention of Congress, which reformed executive 
pensions legislatively in 2004 with § 409A of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Section 409A merely tightens and clarifies the doctrines that had already 
governed executive pensions, leaving the basic economics of executive 
pensions unchanged Executives can still defer taxation on current 
compensation until actual payment is made in the future. Deferral still 
comes at the same price to the employer, namely the deferral of its 
deduction for the compensation expense. Thus, the timing of deduction and 
inclusion are matched Because of this matching, deferral has no tax 
advantage at all except in three scenarios: (1) where the executive faces 
lower tax rates in the future, (2) where the employer faces higher tax rates 
in the future, and (3) where the employer can earn higher after-tax 
investment returns than the executive can earn. The first scenario (higher 
future tax rate for executives) is the most compelling, as executives will 
often face lower tax rates in the future because retirement will bring an end 
to their prime earning years. The second scenario (lower future tax rate for 
employers) is less compelling, as corporate income does not have the same 
life cycle as executives ' income. The third scenario (greater ability for the 
employer to earn after-tax returns) is less compelling as well, given the 
lower tax rates that executives (but not corporate employers) pay on capital 
gains and dividend income. Thus, the primary problem of executive 
pensions is the temporal shifting of executive compensation from high-tax 
years to low-tax years. This temporal shifting is clearly allowed by current 
law, in contrast to personal shifting of compensation income from high-rate 
taxpayers to low-rate taxpayers. The policy concerns are largely the same, 
however, and the tax laws should limit the temporal shifting as well. The 
ideal response would be a system of accrual taxation on executive pensions. 
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The second best would be taxing the delayed payment at the highest 
marginal tax rates that apply to individuals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a corporation makes the following promise to an executive on 
January 1, 2005: "Corporation promises to pay executive $2 million on 
January 1, 2015." When should the executive first pay any tax-2005 or 
2015? The promise is clearly valuable in 2005/ even though the executive 
must wait ten years to be paid. Nonetheless, present law allows the 
corporation and the executive to arrange the promise in a way that defers 
their tax consequences until 2015. 
The path to deferral goes through two gates. The first gate is the 
constructive receipt doctrine, which limits the executive's ability to control 
the timing of payment. A promise will not fit through if the executive has an 
unqualified right to demand immediate payment.2 The second gate is the 
economic benefit doctrine, which limits the security that can be given for the 
promise. A promise will not fit through if the corporation irrevocably secures 
the payment with a trust or similar arrangement.3 In other words, the 
executive must have a mere unfunded promise to pay, which would be 
compromised if the corporation goes bankrupt or becomes insolvent. 
If the promise can pass through these two gates, the executive will not 
pay tax until 2015. If the promise cannot pass through these gates, the 
executive will pay tax in 2005. The corporation can deduct its expense under 
the promise no sooner than the time that the executive includes the payment 
in income. Lawyers and consultants work hard to structure promises so that 
they pass through the gates. 
The prior paragraphs briefly sketch the taxation of executive pensions or 
nonqualified deferred compensation (''NQDC") arrangements. Executive 
pensions are ubiquitous in corporate America, with participation in such 
arrangements usually including most or all low-level and high-level 
executives of public companies.4 And, executive pensions became front-page 
1 If the discount rate is seven percent, then the promise to pay $2 million ten years 
hence has a present value of about $1 million. 
2 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2005). 
3 H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. I (discussing economic benefit doctrine). The economic 
benefit doctrine is largely codified in I.R.C. § 83 (2000). 
4 See Clark Consulting, Executive Benefits Survey 2004 Result at 8 (2004), 
available at 
http://www .clarkconsulting.com/knowledgecenter/surveys/executivebenefits/2004 _ benefi 
t_survey.pdf. The survey is of Fortune 1000 companies, and ninety-four percent of the 
respondents answered that they did use NQDC. 
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news with the collapse of Enron Corporation.5 As Enron's decline and fall 
became apparent internally, its executives took early distributions from their 
Enron executive pensions-the deferred taxation of which was supposedly 
premised on exposing the executives to the credit risk of the employer. Thus, 
in the view of many, Enron executives sidestepped the financial disaster that 
befell their rank-and-file employees.6 Antagonism toward executive pensions 
increased with the disclosure of the $140 million deferred compensation that 
the New York Stock Exchange granted its chairman, Richard Grasso.7 
Congress responded with hearings and enacted § 409A of the Internal 
Revenue Code ("Code") in October 2004.8 Section 409A narrowed the 
constructive receipt gate and patched some holes in the economic benefit 
gate, but continued to allow for deferred taxation on executive pensions. 
Much of the debate leading up to Code § 409A focused on Enron (and like 
scandals) and asked whether the two gates to deferral were too wide.9 With a 
notable exception, 10 little attention was paid to the economics of deferral. 
Perhaps at the margin, fewer executives and corporations will bother 
passing through § 409A's gates. For those who make it through, the 
economics are unchanged. Taxation is still deferred until the date of actual 
payment. The employee pays no tax until then, and the employer takes no 
deduction until then. But why is it that companies and employers defer 
taxation at all? 
Recall the promise made in 2005 to pay $2 million in 2015. The promise 
is surely worth something in 2005, perhaps $1 million or so. 11 Compensation 
occurs in 2005, whereas taxation occurs only in 2015, provided that the 
5 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred 
Compensation Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 487, 491 (2002). For a collection of 
articles analyzing the Enron collapse, see Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, 
Counterfactua/s, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1517, 1518 n.4 (2004). 
6 See Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pens ions of Brick, 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 69, 100 (2002). 
7 See Richard J. Bronstein & Michael D. Levin, A Reasonable Approach to Deferred 
Compensation in the Post-Enron Climate, 103 TAX NOTES 215, 215 (2004). Popular, 
critical accounts of deferred compensation abound in the media. See DA VlD CAY 
JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 45-58 (2003); Timothy L. O'Brien, Mayday? Payday! Hit 
the Silk!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9 2005, § 3, at 1. 
8 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. I 08-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 
1634. 
9 See, e.g., Bronstein & Levin, supra note 7, at 230-33. 
IO Daniel Halperin, A Fairer and More Effective Approach to Deferred 
Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES 1187, 1189 (2004) (proposing a special tax on deferred 
compensation). 
II See supra note 1. 
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parties structure the promise properly. Hence, the executive is essentially 
assigning current compensation to a future tax year. 
By comparison, the executive could not avoid tax by having the 
corporation pay compensation to a child or other object of his or her bounty. 
The compensation is still taxed to the executive under the assignment-of-
income doctrine. Justice Holmes likened compensation to fruit that must be 
taxed to the tree that bore it. 12 Because the executive is the one who bore the 
fruit, then the executive is the one who must pay the tax. 
To extend Holmes' analogy, the executive is "like a tree planted by the 
streams of water, that yields its fruit in its season."13 Tax law successfully 
attaches the fruit to its tree. So, the executive cannot assign compensation to 
someone else. But, tax law fails to attach the fruit to the season in which it 
grew. Thus, the executive (with the corporation's consent) is free to assign 
compensation to some future tax year. This Article explores this freedom and 
asks whether it matters to the fisc. 
This Article begins with an introduction to the taxation of executive 
pensions in Part II. (After this point, executive pensions are referred to by the 
term of art "nonqualified deferred compensation" or simply "NQDC.") Part 
II describes the dimensions of the constructive receipt and economic benefit 
gates as amplified by § 409A. It also describes the critical rule that a 
corporation cannot deduct NQDC until it is actually paid. 
Afterwards, this Article asks whether NQDC is actually costly to the fisc. 
Part III first sets the groundwork for this question by showing that NQDC is 
not costly where executives and corporations are subject to the same 
unchanging tax rates. Next, Part Ill proceeds from this "wage neutrality 
principle" by showing that NQDC saves taxes in potentially three situations: 
(1) where the executive's tax rate will fall in the future, (2) where the 
corporation's tax rate will rise in the future, and (3) where the corporation 
has a lower effective tax rate on investment income. 
Part IV evaluates these results under the current tax system. The 
conclusion is that the primary tax savings come from executives' shifting 
compensation to low-tax years in the future. Unlike executives, however, 
corporations are unlikely to have a systematic incentive to assign the tax 
consequences of compensation to future tax years. Corporations do have an 
incentive to assign the compensation expense to future years if current 
compensation is not deductible because of certain limits on executive 
compensation. Finally, the shifting of investment income from the executive 
to the corporation is unlikely to produce tax savings because of the huge tax 
preference that individuals receive for capital gains. 
12 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, 115 (1930). 
13 Psalms 1:3. 
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Part V examines current doctrine in light of the conclusions from Part 
IV. By merely limiting control and security, current doctrine does not address 
the impact that NQDC has upon the fisc. Part V proposes a first best and a 
second best reform of the taxation of NQDC. The first best is to tax it on an 
accrual basis (i.e., when earned rather than when paid). Doing this would 
give NQDC no tax advantage or disadvantage compared with current 
compensation. The second best is to retain today's regime of deferred 
taxation, but to tax all ultimate payments at the highest marginal rates. This 
reform would eliminate the incentive to shift compensation from high-tax 
years of employment to low-tax years of retirement. Part VI has some 
concluding remarks. 
II. TAXATION OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A. Tax Accounting for Deferred Compensation 
The tax issues of NQDC are of accounting: When should an employee 
include deferred compensation in income? When should an employer deduct 
such compensation? For properly planned NQDC, the answer to both 
questions is "upon cash payment."14 
Individual employees may-and almost always do--use the cash method 
of accounting to calculate their taxes. 15 Under the cash method, amounts are 
included in gross income upon receipt by the taxpayer. 16 Payments are 
deducted when actually made. 17 The year in which the amounts are earned 
(or accrued) is irrelevant to the determination. The year of "receipt" is what 
matters. Actual receipt of compensation always triggers taxation under the 
cash method and is usually accomplished by cash, check, or similar transfer. 
Deferral of tax cannot extend beyond the time of actual receipt. 
Recall the promise from above where the corporation promises to pay an 
executive $2 million in 2015. Actual receipt occurs in 2015, and properly 
planned NQDC will allow the executive to defer taxation until this date. The 
fact that the executive has clearly been enriched when the promise was made 
in 2005 is usually irrelevant. 
14 What makes NQDC "properly planned" is discussed infra Part II.B. 
15 See STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING para. 3.01[2] (2d ed. 
1993 & Supp. 2003); BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS para. 105.3.1 (2d ed. 1992) ("[The cash method] is almost 
universally employed by wage earners and employees. It is almost equally popular 
among . . . taxpayers engaged in furnishing personal services, such as doctors and 
lawyers"). 
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(i) (2005). 
17 See id. 
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Sometimes, however, taxation may occur before actual receipt. Under the 
doctrine of constructive receipt, an employee may be taxed earlier if the 
employee may choose between withdrawing or deferring distributions from 
the plan. Under the doctrine of economic benefit, an employee may be taxed 
earlier if payment of future benefits is sufficiently secured. The development 
and contours of these two doctrines are discussed below.18 
As for who pays NQDC, this Article focuses on large corporate 
employers. The reason for this focus is that large corporate employers almost 
certainly pay the large majority of NQDC, which is used to compensate 
professional managers (not owner-managers)19 who demand more deferred 
compensation than can be given under the more advantageous system of 
qualified retirement plans. Indeed, some view NQDC in terms of agency 
costs or hidden compensation rather than tax advantages; these explanations 
are most apt to professionally managed corporations.20 
Large corporate employers may not use the cash method of accounting. 
Instead, the Code forces them to use the accrual method. 21 Under the accrual 
method, amounts are included in, or deducted from, income based on the 
"all-events test." A right to payment produces income when "all the events 
have occurred that fix the right to receive the income and the amount of the 
income can be determined with reasonable accuracy."22 Similarly, a liability 
produces a deductible expense "in the taxable year in which all events have 
occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can 
be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has 
occurred with respect to the liability."23 
The accrual method of accounting does not, however, apply to NQDC. 
As noted before, the executive must use the cash method. Under Code 
§ 404(a)(5), employers can deduct the cost ofNQDC only after the executive 
has included benefits in taxable income.24 So, employers are locked into the 
cash method of accounting used by the executive. 25 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 Sole proprietors, partners, or S corporation shareholders are taxed directly on the 
income of their businesses. 
20 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 95-107 
(2004). 
21 See I.R.C. § § 446(c}-448(a)(1) (2000). Three limited types of C corporations 
could use the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting: a farming business, 
a "qualified personal services corporation," and a corporation with under $5,000,000 of 
gross receipts. See generally BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, at para. 1 05.1.3. 
22 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2005). 
23 See id. 
24 I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (2000). If benefits are included because the employee is the 
beneficiary of a separate trust, then a separate account must be established for the 
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Recall again the promise, made by the corporation in 2005, to pay the 
executive $2 million in 2015. The expense appears to have satisfied the all-
events test, which would ordinarily allow for deduction in 2005.26 Indeed, the 
executive would include income in 2005 if he or she operated under the 
accrual method. Because the executive is on the cash method, he or she waits 
until 2015 to include the amount in income. Section 404(a)(5) forces the 
corporation to wait until2015 to deduct its expense. 
By matching the accounting methods of the corporation and executive, 
§ 404(a)(5) makes it at least plausible that NQDC is tax neutral. The 
possibility of tax neutrality is developed more fully below,27 but first 
consider a world without the matching system of§ 404(a)(5). In this world, 
the corporation would deduct its NQDC when the expense accrues, but the 
executive would include it in income only upon payment. Returning to our 
example, the corporation would deduct the $1 million expense in 2005.28 
Presumably, the corporation will invest the $1 million in a suitable vehicle 
for the benefit of the executive. Suppose that the return is ten percent per 
year. So, in the first year, the investment returns $100,000. The corporation 
pays tax on $100,000 as investment income, but it also deducts $100,000 as 
compensation expense to the executive. It is a wash, and the corporation is 
effectively tax exempt on the investment income. Upon ultimate payment by 
the corporation, the executive will pay tax on the $1 million that was 
originally deferred plus all of the interim investment gains. 
This imaginary world of NQDC without § 404(a)(5) describes the real 
world taxation of qualified retirement plans and individual retirement 
accounts. The employer gets a current deduction, interim investment income 
is tax exempt, and the employee pays no tax until actual cash payment. This 
special tax treatment is equivalent to complete forgiveness of tax on 
employee before the employer can take a deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l2(b)(3) 
(2005). 
25 The Code contains a handful of other cases where an accrual-method payor is 
locked into the accounting method of a cash-method payee. See generally Deborah A. 
Geir, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 17, 156 
(1998). These include I.R.C. § 83(h) (2000) (deduction for employee stock options) and 
I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (2000) (deductible payments to a related party). Similarly, the original-
issue-discount regime places cash-basis bondholders on an accrual basis with respect to 
interest income. See I.R.C § 1271-75. 
26 Cf Burnham Corp. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 953, 958 (1988) (holding that future 
payments are not discounted for present value under the all-events test), ajf'd, 878 F.2d 
86 (2d Cir. 1989). 
27 See infra Part liLA (wage neutrality principle). 
28 If the future payment is reasonably ascertainable, the future payment itself may be 
deductible in 2005 without any discount for the time value of money. Burnham Corp., 90 
T.C. at 958. 
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investment.29 The public cost of this special treatment for qualified 
retirement plans is stupendous, estimated at more than $120 billion for 
2005.30 
Current law is clear that the corporation cannot deduct any part of the 
expense of NQDC until actual payment. The taxpayer in Albertson's, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,31 however, attempted to secure a partial mismatch. To 
simplify the facts, assume again that the executive defers $1 million. There 
was no question in Albertson 's that the corporation had to wait until actual 
payout to deduct this amount. What the taxpayer did claim was that it could 
deduct interim interest credits on an accrual basis. On this theory, the 
taxpayer would be effectively tax exempt on any interest income it received 
with respect to the $1,000,000. This would have placed NQDC on essentially 
the same footing as a nondeductible IRA, as the initial contribution does not 
receive a tax preference, but the interim investment returns do. The taxpayer 
in Albertson's at first won in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. Upon rehearing en bane, the court reversed, noting how the 
taxpayer's position would have moved the treatment ofNQDC closer to that 
of the subsidized qualified retirement plans. 
Tax students are often taught from day one that deferral of taxation is 
inherently valuable to the taxpayer and costly to the fisc.32 Section 404(a)(5) 
ensures, however, that deferral is not inherently valuable in the context of 
NQDC. The burden of taxation to the executive is deferred, but so is the 
benefit of deduction to the corporation. The next Part of this Article explores 
when NQDC produces tax savings at all. 
This Part next examines the doctrines associated with NQDC. These 
doctrines determine when the taxation of compensation can be deferred at all. 
After that, this Part examines qualified retirement plans, which receive an 
enormous tax subsidy (as already noted), presumably to promote savings. 
29 See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 68 (3d ed. 2005) 
("[P]ension savings are equivalent to tax exemption."). 
30 The number is drawn from the tax expenditure budget prepared by the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. It includes the tax expenditures for employer-provided pension 
plans, IRAs, and Keogh plans. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATE OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, JCS 1-05, at 39-40 (2005). 
31 The three decisions are Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 415 (1990) 
(holding for Commissioner), rev 'd in part, 38 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1993), rev 'd on reh'g 
42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994). 
32 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 30-32 (13th ed. 
2003). 
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B. Doctrines of Deferred Compensation 
The basic tax accounting of NQDC was just presented. Properly 
structured, NQDC defers taxation on the executive, but also defers the 
deduction for the corporation. Any investment gains during the interim are 
taxed to the corporation. 
This section examines what goes into the proper structure ofNQDC. The 
goal is to show that there are two gateways to deferral-the economic benefit 
doctrine (which limits security) and the constructive receipt doctrine (which 
limits control). The following Part III shows that the tax savings of NQDC 
come solely from differences in tax rates between the parties and over time. 
These differences have nothing to do with the excess control or security that 
concerns current doctrine. Part V elaborates on this disconnectedness and 
ultimately argues for new doctrine that addresses the economics. 
Starting on January 1, 2005, the income taxation of NQDC is largely 
statutory. The two key statutes are § 83 (which taxes the transfer of 
"property") and § 409A (which provides additional rules on the taxation of 
NQDC). Conceptually, § 83 implements the economic benefit doctrine, 
whereas§ 409A implements the constructive receipt doctrine.33 Section 83 is 
the broader and conceptually more coherent statute and is dealt with first. 
Section 83 taxes transfers of "property" to employees once the interest in 
the property is vested. 34 Property is defined as "(r]eal and personal property 
other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money 
or property in the future."35 Thus, § 83 does not reach such promises, and 
they escape tax (unless they trigger constructive receipt). An "unfunded 
promise to pay" is at the heart of current doctrine and the classic description 
of NQDC.36 Because this mere promise to pay might be breached, it is 
thought that future payment is too speculative to trigger current taxation on 
the cash method of accounting. 37 
33 Code § 409A does, however, augment some aspects of the economic benefit 
doctrine, notably by limiting the use of so-called rabbi trusts. See infra notes 152-158 
and accompanying text. 
34 I.R.C. § 83 (2000); Treas. Reg. § l.83-3(b) (2005); Treas. Reg. § l.83-3(cXl) 
(2005). 
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2005). 
36 See also Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (not imposing tax on a "mere promise 
to pay, not represented by notes or secured in any way"). 
3? Some commentators feel that the exemption for unsecured and unfunded promises 
to pay is practically limited to NQDC situations. In their discussion of unsecured and 
unfunded third-party promises to pay, Professors Polsky and Hellwig recently argued that 
Code § 83's exemption for unsecured and unfunded promises applies exclusively to two-
party promises between service recipients (employers) and service providers 
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The upshot of this formulation is that the executive must bear the risk 
that the corporation will go bankrupt or become insolvent. The requirement 
of credit risk is highlighted by the § 83 regulations. They state that "[t]he 
term [property] also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money) 
which are transferred or set aside from the claims of creditors of the 
transferor, for example, in a trust or escrow account."38 Thus, a cash basis 
executive will be taxed if the corporation places funds into an irrevocable 
trust for the executive's benefit--even if the executive could not control the 
timing of payment. 39 
There is a corollary-assets still subject to the claims of an employer's 
creditors escape tax under Code § 83.40 So-called "rabbi trusts'.41 illustrate 
the limits of this notion. A rabbi trust is used to fund NQDC and pay 
executives their benefits when due. The key to avoiding current taxation is 
that trust assets are available to pay the claims of the employer's general, 
unsecured creditors in the event of the employer's insolvency or bankruptcy. 
Assuming other (less important) requirements are met, the executive will not 
be taxed under economic benefit principles by reason of benefiting under a 
rabbi trust.42 Instead, the rabbi trust will be disregarded as a tax entity, and its 
assets will be deemed to be owned directly by the corporation. 
Thus, the rabbi trust does not completely remove the credit risk. The 
executive does have some security, in that the corporation cannot stonewall 
executives or force them to sue in court while funds sit in trust. These 
concerns are particularly high where a change in control is expected.43 Still, 
the remaining credit risk puts the executive in the same posture as an 
unsecured creditor of the corporation. 
(employees), effectively closing the door on applying the § 83 exemption in any context 
but NQDC. See Gregg D. Polsky and Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay, 89 
MINN. L. REv. 1092, 1127-29 (2005). 
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2005). 
39 See also Sproull v. Comrn' r, 16 T.C. 244,247 (1951) (imposing tax on economic 
benefit principles before enactment of§ 83), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 
1952). 
40 See also I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (2000) ("Contributions to an employees' trust ... shall 
be included in the gross income of the employee in accordance with section 83 .... "). 
41 The rabbi trust derives its name from the IRS ruling first approving such an 
arrangement in 1980. See MICHAELS. SIRKIN & LAWRENCE K. CAGNEY, EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION§ 8.04[2][a] n.7 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8113107 (Dec. 31 , 1980)). 
42 Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 I.R.B. 11 contains a model grantor trust that is typically 
used in practice. The DOL has ruled that using a rabbi trust does not endanger the 
unfunded status of a top hat plan. See DOL Adv. Op. 91-16A (Apr. 5, 1991). 
43 See, e.g., SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 41 , at§ 8.04[2]. 
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A mere unfunded promise to pay also might be taxable if it is readily 
assignable. 44 This notion is illustrated by Cowden v. Commissioner,45 in 
which the court said: 
We are convinced that if a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is 
unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of a kind that is 
frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially 
greater than the generally prevailing premium for the use of money, such 
promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like manner as cash would 
have been taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather than the 
obligation.46 
Thus, readily assignable obligations would be subject to tax. Such 
obligations would not technically be property under § 83, as they are 
unfunded promises to pay.47 Nonetheless, they are taxed essentially as 
property because they give the recipient the extra security of being able to 
assign the obligation to a third party.48 
The economic benefit doctrine mandates a lack of security in payment 
from the employer. Acting alone, the executive may take steps to secure 
payment. The IRS has approved purchases by executives of insurance 
policies and surety bonds payable upon default of NQDC obligations.49 
These arrangements negate the credit risk inherent in rabbi trusts and 
unfunded NQDC while still deferring taxation. The IRS implied that the 
policy or bond needed to be purchased without the help of the employer. A 
practitioner questions the usefulness of these techniques, reporting that the 
market for them is thin and expensive. 5° 
44 Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428. 
45 Cowden v. Comm'r, 289 F.2d 20,25 (5th Cir. 1961). 
46 /d. 
47 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2005). 
48 It is curious that Code § 409A does not address assignability, as Revenue 
Procedure 92-65 prohibited assignability of NQDC. Presumably, the cash equivalency 
doctrine would fill this void. Cf IRS Notice 2005-1 I.R.B. 274 (stating that cash 
equivalency doctrine still applies after I.R.C. § 409A (2000)). 
49 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038 (Aug. 2, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-06-
012 (Nov. 3, 1983). 
SO See DONALD 0. JANSEN, NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION (SECURING 
THE UNSECURED PROMISE TO PAY) 30-33 (2003), 
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/NonQualifiedDefered.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006). It is conceivable that executives could turn to over-the-counter derivates 
to hedge or eliminate the risk of default. Cf Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing 
Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 677, 706-17 (2002) 
(describing the operations of credit derivatives); Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic 
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The other key . doctrine is constructive receipt, which is implemented 
primarily by Code § 409A (at least with respect to NQDC). The seminal 
statement of constructive receipt is from the regulations which state: 
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is 
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is 
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so 
that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it 
during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. 
However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of 
its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. 51 
More colloquially, the courts and the IRS have said that "under the 
doctrine of constructive receipt, a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back 
upon income and thereby select the year for which he will report it."52 
However it is expressed, constructive receipt limits the control that an 
executive may have over NQDC. Too much control triggers current taxation. 
"How much is too much" was litigated by the IRS (with little success) 
for decades.53 The key issues were the degree of freedom over initial 
elections to defer and over later elections to withdraw. For example, suppose 
an executive will earn a salary of $500,000 in 2006 and wants to defer 
$1 00,000; when must such an election be made? Suppose the executive 
previously deferred $500,000, can the executive reach this while still 
employed? How much flexibility can the executive have in determining the 
timing of payments? 
These questions are largely settled by the enactment of Code § 409A in 
October 2004.54 After December 31, 2004, an NQDC plan must satisfy 
Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT' L L. 541, 549-55 (2002) (same); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The 
Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 449 
(2000) (focusing on hedging with respect to stock options). 
51 Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-2(a) (2005). 
52 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (citations omitted); accord Martin v. Comm'r, 
96 T.C. 814, 823 (1991). 
53 For example, cases allowed terminating employees to choose between a lump-
sum and installment distribution. See Martin, 96 T.C. at 829. They also allowed 
employees to choose between current and deferred payment after the compensation had 
been earned. See Veit v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 809, 818 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 4 (I.R.S. 
1947) (Veil I); Veit v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M 919 (1949) (Veit II) . 
54 What ultimately prompted Congress to enact Code § 409A was not a desire to 
remedy IRS failures. Instead, it was a response to the corporate scandals at Enron and 
elsewhere. A prime example of the perceived abuse was the so-called haircut 
distributions than many NQDC plans allowed. 
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§ 409A if tax deferral is desired. Section 409A contains the following 
restrictions on NQDC: 
Elections to Defer: Elections to defer compensation be made before the 
calendar year in which services are rendered, subject to a 30-day grace period 
for new plans and new employees. 55 
Timing of Distributions: Distributions cannot be made until the earliest of 
(i) separation from service, (ii) disability, (iii) death, (iv) change in control, 
(v) unforeseeable emergency, or (vi) according to the time or schedule 
specified in the plan when the deferral is made. 
Additional Restrictions on Top Executives: Distributions to the top fifty 
executives of a publicly traded company are subject to even tighter 
restrictions. 56 They may not receive a distribution until six months after 
separation from service (although a beneficiary could receive a distribution 
immediately after an executive's death). 
Accelerations Not Possible: The NQDC plan must not allow or make any 
distributions before the earliest time specified above. Thus, the haircut 
distribution57 is outlawed. More generally, suppose that an NQDC plan 
specifies that an executive will receive benefits in ten annual installments 
starting one year after separation from service. Section 409A prohibits the 
plan from paying benefits faster than per this schedule.58 So, the executive 
who previously elected installments could not later elect to receive a lump-
sum payment. 
Delays Possible, Subject to Limits: Unlike acceleration, delay is allowed 
at the executive's election (subject to limits). Any election to delay benefit 
payments must be made at least twelve months before the first payment is to 
be made. Also, the delay must be for at least five years. Again, suppose that 
an NQDC plan specifies that an executive will receive benefits in ten annual 
installments starting one year after separation from service. Up until 
separation from service, an executive could elect to delay receiving benefit 
551.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i}-(ii) (2000). For "performance-based compensation 
based on services performed over a period of at least 12 months," the election may be 
made up to six months before the end of the period. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(iii) (2000). 
56 Technically, all key employees of a publicly traded company are subject to this 
restriction. "Key employee" is defined in I.R.C. § 416(i) (2000). As a practical matter, the 
only people who will qualify as key employees will be the top fifty officers described in 
I.R.C. § 416(i)(1)(A)(i) (2000). 
57 A haircut distribution is an early distribution subject to a penalty. See Lee A. 
Sheppard, News Analysis: The Thin End of the Wedge of Deferred Compensation, 96 TAX 
NOTES 1549, 1551 (Sept. 16, 2002). 
58 Limited exceptions are available for accelerated payments. They include domestic 
relations orders, forced divestitures, cash outs of benefits worth $10,000 or less, and the 
payment of employment taxes. See IRS Notice 2005-1 l.R.B. 274, Q&A-15. 
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payments. The delay must be of at least five years. So, for example, the 
executive could elect to receive ten annual installments starting six years 
after separation from service. 
Penalties for Noncompliance: Failure to satisfy Code§ 409A will subject 
the executive to current taxation, plus interest and a 20% penalty, on any 
benefits that have been fully earned. 59 
One might initially think that § 409A will curtail the use of NQDC. 
Section 409A does curtail the amount of control that an executive can have 
over elections to defer compensation and to take distributions. Also, it 
harshens the consequences for triggering constructive receipt by imposing 
interest and a twenty percent penalty. Thus, § 409A lines the gateway of 
constructive receipt with the barbed wire of interest and penalties. 
However, § 409A will (with further IRS guidance) clarify a previously 
murky area of law. In some ways, NQDC is less risky now that discemable 
rules are in place. Moreover, § 409A does not change the basic tax issues of 
NQDC plans that successfully pass through the gateways constructive receipt 
and economic benefit. Executives and employers can still defer taxation. If 
tax deferral reduces tax revenues, it will continue to do so. 
C. Comparison with Qualified Retirement Plans 
Qualified retirement plans are not the subject of this Article. 
Nonetheless, a brief description of their taxation is useful for two reasons. 
First, given the superiority of qualified retirement plans, employers usually 
resort to NQDC only when qualified retirement plans are unavailable or too 
expensive. Second, the limits on qualified retirement plans represent the 
limits on the public subsidy for savings. Thus, NQDC should be treated 
neutrally, not preferentially, by the tax system. 
For low-paid employees, qualified retirement plans are the sole source of 
employment-based savings. Empirical evidence suggests that low-paid 
employees do not take full advantage of their opportunity to save in qualified 
retirement plans.60 So, employers have no incentive to offer such employees 
any savings vehicle other than qualified retirement plans. Moreover, ERISA 
effectively prohibits employers from offering NQDC to low-paid employees. 
In general, pension and deferred compensation plans must be funded under 
59 The benefits are fully earned when they are not subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(l)(A)(i)(ll) (2000). A substantial risk of forfeiture exists 
when the executive has to perform further services to earn the benefits. See IRS Notice 
2005-1 I.R.B. 274, Q&A-IO(a). 
60 See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 
46 ARiz. L. REv. 53, 65-66 (2004). 
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ERISA,61 but such funding is inconsistent with the economic benefit 
doctrine. ERISA's funding requirements do not apply, however, if a plan is 
maintained for a "select group of management or highly compensated 
employees."62 So, NQDC is effectively and formally limited to executives 
and other highly paid employees. 
NQDC would not exist if qualified retirement plans had no limits, 
because qualified retirement plans are almost always superior. Qualified 
retirement plans have three tax advantages: (1) the employer deducts 
contributions at the time they are made to the plan, (2) these contributions 
grow tax free while held by the plan, and (3) the employee pays no tax until 
benefit payments are actually made by the plan, even if the employee could 
demand an earlier payment.63 Theoretically, this arrangement is tantamount 
to the forgiveness of all taxes on the income earned while amounts are held 
by the qualified retirement plan.64 As noted above, the cost of this 
preferential tax treatment is enormous, more than $120 billion in 2005.65 
Because of this treatment, qualified retirement plans receive much more 
favorable tax treatment than that received by NQDC. Even though the 
executive defers his or her tax burden through NQDC, the corporation must 
defer its deduction. Any funding for NQDC is held directly by, and taxed 
directly to, the employer.66 The only time NQDC has a tax advantage over 
qualified retirement plans is when the employer's current marginal tax rate is 
much lower than it will be when benefits are ultimately paid.67 
Qualified retirement plans are superior for the additional reason that they 
are not subject to the economic benefit doctrine. In fact, security is mandated, 
not prohibited. Benefits must be secured by an irrevocable trust for the sole 
6! See generally I.R.C. § 412 (2000); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA)§§ 301-308,29 U.S.C. § § 1081-1086 (2005). 
62 See ERISA § 30l(a)(3) (exempting from funding requirement "a plan which is 
unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing 
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated 
employees"). Such plans are often called "top hat" plans, and the eligible group the "top 
hat" group. See PAMELA D. PERDUE, QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS 
para. 4.02 (2004). 
63 See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND 
RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6, JCX-29-02 (2002). 
64 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 68. 
65 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
66 Since a rabbi trust is a grantor trust, its income is taxed directly to the employer. 
67 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 262-63. Conceptually, the advantage of 
deducting under the higher future rate must offset the disadvantage of paying taxes on 
interim investment income. 
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purpose of paying benefits.68 The funded trust protects employees from the 
risk that the employer would go bankrupt or become insolvent. Defined 
benefit plans must be partially insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, a quasi-governmental agency.69 
Qualified retirement plans are superior for the final reason that they are 
not subject to the constructive receipt doctrine. The unexercised power to 
demand a distribution at will does not trigger taxation.70 The primary 
restrictions on employee control protect the employee's spouse,71 limit 
distributions while the employee is still employed,72 discourage distributions 
before the employee reaches age 59.5,73 and mandate the commencement of 
distributions shortly after the employee reaches age 70.5.74 The theory behind 
these restrictions is that qualified retirement plans should be used for the 
retirement needs of the employee and his or her spouse. The restrictions are 
not imposed in order to implement any doctrinal or accounting notion of 
constructive receipt. 
Thus, qualified retirement plans appear to be unambiguously better than 
NQDC. Qualified retirement plans receive an enormous tax subsidy, are 
secured by irrevocable funding, and can be subject to the control of the 
employee. The advantages are constrained, however, when employers give 
benefits to highly paid employees. The Code and regulations purport to 
ensure that low-paid employees receive some benefits by prohibiting 
discrimination in favor of highly paid employees. 75 Discrimination is 
measured by complex formulae set forth in the regulations. 76 It is sufficient 
for curre11t purposes to note that an employer who grants qualified retirement 
plan benefits to executives must also grant benefits to lower-paid employees. 
Dollar caps also apply to benefits, and these dollar caps are often 
significant to NQDC. If an executive hits one of these caps in a qualified 
68 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (2000); ERISA§ § 403(a), 404(a)(l)(A). 
69 See ERISA§§ 4001-4402. 
70 See DIANNE BENNETI ET AL., TAXATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS FROM QUALIFIED 
PLANS 2004/2005 para. l.03[3)[c) n.40 (2004). 
71 See I.R.C. § 417 (2000). 
72 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 40l(k)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000). 
73 See I.R.C. § § 72(t) (2000); 40l(k)(2)(B)(i)(III) (2000). 
74 See I.R.C. § 40l(a)(9)(c)(i)(I) (2000). 
75 For this purpose, a highly compensated employee is one who earned more than 
$90,000 in the previous year or who was a five percent owner of the employer for the 
current or previous year. The $90,000 figure is for 2004 and is adjusted annually for 
inflation. See I.R.C. § 414(q) (2000); IRS Notice 2003-73,2003-45 I.R.B. 1017 (Nov. 10, 
2003). What constitutes "discrimination" is beyond the scope of this Article. 
76 See Treas. Reg. § § l.401(a)(4)-0 (2005); l.410(b)-O (2005). 
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retirement plan, employers often give more benefits through NQDC. The 
following dollar caps are for the year 2005: 
Compensation Cap: If plan benefits are based on compensation, then 
compensation over $210,000 must be disregarded.77 
401(k) Cap: An employee under a~e fifty cannot contribute more than 
$14,000 to a 401(k) plan for year 2005.7 An employee age fifty or older may 
contribute an extra $4,000 for year 2005.79 
Defined Contribution Cap: A defined contribution plan may not grant 
benefits greater than $42,000 in year 2005.80 This $42,000 cap also includes 
any amounts contributed by the employee. So, if an employee contributes 
$14,000 to a 401(k) plan, the employer could give no more than $28,000 in 
extra benefits via a defined contribution plan. 
Defined Benefit Cap: A defined benefit plan may not give a benefit 
greater than $170,000 per year starting at age sixty-five.81 The benefit may 
also not exceed 100% of the participant's average compensation for the three 
years when compensation was highest. 82 
The nondiscrimination rules and the benefit caps illustrate the limits of 
public subsidies for savings. Executives and highly paid employees can 
receive a subsidy for their employment-based savings through a qualified 
retirement plan. However, this subsidy is limited (because of the caps) and 
conditional (because of the nondiscrimination rules). Once employers and 
highly-paid employees hit the caps or become unwilling to abide by the 
nondiscrimination conditions, they should not receive any further subsidy for 
employment-based savings as a matter of policy. 
Ill. ECONOMICS OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A. Wage Neutrality Principle 
The prior Part developed the doctrine of NQDC and some of the 
rudimentary economics. NQDC must pass through the two gates of economic 
benefit and constructive receipt. Once through, NQDC generates no tax for 
the executive-and no deduction for the corporation-until actual payout. 
Finally, the taxation of NQDC is almost always inferior to that of qualified 
77 I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (2000); I.R.S. News Release 2004-127 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
78 I.R.C. § 402(g) (2000). 
79 I.R.C. § 414(vX2)(B) (2000). 
80 I.R.C. § 415(c) (2000); I.R.S. News Release 2004-127 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
81 I.R.C. § 415(bX1){A) (2000); I.R.S. News Release 2004-127 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
82 I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
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retirement plans. Nonetheless, we must ask whether NQDC produces any tax 
savings where qualified retirement plans are unavailable. 
If the corporation and the executive face the same tax rate, then the 
payment of compensation produces no net revenue to the government. 83 The 
corporation's deduction causes a depletion of the fisc, and the executive's 
income causes an addition. The size of the depletion and addition are the 
same because the tax rates are assumed the same. Thus, the potential for tax 
neutrality exists because of the two-party matching system of§ 404(a)(5).84 
Since the cash payment of compensation produces no net revenue, it does not 
matter whether cash payment occurs today or in the future. 
Of course, investment taxation comes into play with NQDC. Suppose 
compensation is earned in period one but not paid until period ten. During 
the interim, the corporation will pay tax on any investment gains it might 
receive. In contrast, the executive would pay this tax if the compensation had 
not been deferred. This does not change the analysis so long as the executive 
and the corporation are at the same tax rate. 85 
This wage neutrality principle shows that tax deferral is not inherently 
valuable where the corporation must defer its deduction. This point no longer 
applies, however, when differing tax rates are introduced. The corporation 
and executive may be subject to different tax rates both currently and in the 
future. These different rates will affect the value of any tax deduction and the 
burden of any taxable income. Also, deferred compensation may be invested 
between the time it is earned and the time it is paid. Differing tax rates here 
may also affect the tax savings from deferral. Elaboration on how these 
shifting and differing rates affect NQDC is the goal of the remainder of this 
Part.86 
B. Future Value of Current Compensation 
Deferred compensation occurs when an employee foregoes current 
compensation and purchases a "security" of the employer firm with the 
foregone compensation.87 The security is the rights under the NQDC plan. 
83 See Daniell. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 
95 YALE L.J. 506, 520 (1986); Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 
SMU L.. REv. 383,401-04 (1999). 
84 See Geier, supra note 25. 
85 See Halperin, supra note 83, at 519-24. 
86 The model developed here is based on SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 212-16. 
87 Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Executive Compensation, Taxes, and 
Incentives, in FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER, 179, 185 
(William F. Sharpe & Cathryn M. Cootner eds., 1982). 
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The goal of this section is to quantify the future value of current (i.e., un-
deferred) compensation. 
Current cash compensation is the baseline against which NQDC is 
measured. Thus, the question is whether the employee would be better off 
receiving current cash or NQDC.88 Whether the employee would be better off 
under some third program (like stock options or other form of equity 
compensation) is not explored here.89 
Rather than deferring compensation into the future, the employee could 
take current compensation and invest it. Starting with current compensation, 
we assume the following variables: 
D = amount of current compensation 
N =deferral horizon measured in years (e.g., ten years) 
t10 =individual tax rate today (time zero) 
For now, we can ignore corporate tax rates and changes in the 
executive's tax rate. These will, however, be critical in examining the future 
value of deferred compensation. We must, however, have a function that 
expresses the after-tax growth of the executive's investments: 
F J(N) = after-tax future value factor for individual investments measured 
as a function of the years held (N) 
For example, if we knew that FJ(10)=1.63, then a current investment of 
$1 would grow to $1.63, after tax, in ten years. Such a return would represent 
an annual after-tax return of about 5%.90 
If an executive takes current compensation of D and pays tax on that 
amount, he or she will be left with D x (1- t 10 ) . Investing this for N years, 
produces: 
Equation 1 
D x (1-t10 )x F1 (N) 
Equation 1 is the baseline against which NQDC will be measured. It 
shows how much money the executive has, after tax, in period N. 
For example, if the executive can receive 5% after-tax annually, then we 
know: 
88 See id at 184 ("In assessing the tax consequences of a particular scheme of 
deferred compensation, the natural benchmark is the treatment of a current cash payment 
of salary or bonus of equal before-tax present value."). 
89 Others have compared current cash with stock options and other equity 
compensation. See Miller & Scholes, supra note 87, at 188-95; Michael S. Knoll, The 
Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, l 03 TAX NOTES 203, 203 (2004); David I. 
Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 695, 695 (2004); 
Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most Expensive Way to Pay Future Cash, 
52 SMU L. REv. 423,423 (1999). 
90 l-(l.63)0· 10~o .os . 
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FI(N) = (1.05)N 
Suppose that D is $100,000 and that the executive pays tax (t10=35%) 
currently. D has $650,000 to investment. If the investment horizon is N= 10 
years, then future value is: 
$100,000 X (1- .35) X (1.05)10 = $105,878.15 
C. Future Value of Deferred Compensation 
Setting the baseline is not quite enough. An employee is always better 
off receiving more compensation, and the employer is better off paying less. 
To neutralize this tension, we assume that the cost and (to the extent 
possible) risk to the employer are the same for current or deferred 
compensation. Thus, the employer is assumed to be indifferent between 
paying current cash or granting the NQDC "security." Any benefits to 
NQDC will go to the. employee under these assumptions. · 
The following variables are now defined: 
tc0 =corporate tax rate today (time zero) 
teN= corporate tax rate in future (time "N') 
tm =individual tax rate in future (time "N') 
The ability of the corporation to earn income after-tax is represented by 
the following function: 
F c(N) = after-tax future-value factor for corporate investments measured 
as a function of the years held (N) 
To fulfill the assumption of indifference, we assume that the corporation 
is unwilling to spend more on deferred compensation than on current 
compensation (measured on an after-tax basis). The after-tax cost of paying 
current compensation is D x (1- t co) . This is gross compensation (D) minus 
the value of the tax deduction. Next, we assume that the corporation is 
willing to set aside this after-tax amount and let it grow through investment 
until time N. At time N, it will have grown to: 
Equation 2 
D x (1- leo) x Fc(N) 
Note that the corporation will receive a deduction when it actually pays 
this amount at time N. Thus, the corporation should be willing to "gross up" 
the payment so that its after-tax cost at time N is simply the amount it has set 
aside per Equation 2. To find the pre-tax amount of payment, Equation 2 is 
divided by (1- teN): 
Equation 3 
Dx (1- teo) x Fc(N) 
(1-tcN) 
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The executive must pay tax on this gross payment based on the rate at 
time N. So, the net amount received by the executive is 
Equation 4 
D x (1- teo) x Fe (N) x (1- tIN) 
(1-teN) 
Above, we analyzed current compensation where D=$1 00,000, N= 10, 
t10=35%, and F1(N) = (1.05)N. Suppose now that the corporation pays 35% 
tax as well (both today and at N) and has the same earning ability as the 
executive. So, tea= ter 110 and Fl(N)= Fe(N). However, suppose that at N the 
executive will be at a tax rate of tnv=25%. The future value of the deferred 
compensation is thus: 
$100,000 X (1- .35) X (1.05) 10 X (1- .25) = $ 122 167_10 (1- .35) ' 
Because the executive is paying a lower future tax rate (25%) than today 
(35%), deferral produces a significantly better return ($122,167.10 versus 
$105,878.15). 
D. Measuring Advantage of Deferred Compensation 
1. Three Ratios 
The previous example showed that deferred compensation was superior 
when individual rates are falling. Now, the Article turns to a more general 
comparison. 
The future value (at time N) of deferred compensation is given above in 
Equation 4. The future value of current compensation (at time N) is given 
above in Equation 1. Let Q be the quotient of the two equations. Q is the 
surprisingly elegant: 
Equation 5 
[Fc(N)]x[1- tiN ]x[1- feo] = Q91 FI(N) 1-tiO 1-teN 
Where Q> 1, we know that deferred compensation is superior. Where 
Q<l, we know that current compensation is superior. Where Q=l, the two 
are equivalent. 
Equation 5 is based on three ratios.92 The first compares the ability to 
produce after-tax investment earnings, F c(N) and F J(N). The second 
91 This is essentially the result given in SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 214. 
92 Another way to express Equation 5 is : 
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compares current and future individual tax rates, ho and tJN. The third 
compares current and future corporate tax rates, teo and teN· Thus, NQDC 
tends to be attractive under the following three circumstances:93 
1. when corporate employers can earn greater after-tax investment 
income than their employees (presumably by lower tax rates); 
2. when individual tax rates are falling; and 
3. when corporate tax rates are rising. 
The tax rates in the equations above are marginal tax rates. In the case of 
a corporation, they state the marginal tax benefit to deducting compensation. 
In the case of an executive, the equations state the marginal tax cost of 
including compensation. 
2. Wage Neutrality Revisited 
The wage neutrality principle is illustrated where all the ratios are the 
same. Here, Q= 1, and there is no advantage or disadvantage to deferral. This 
highlights the important point that deferral of income is not inherently 
valuable where the deduction must be deferred as well. 
Recall how, under the wage neutrality principle, the payment of wages 
might simply allocate the tax burden associated with economic profit. 
Suppose F e(N)=F I(N), te0=t and teN=tJN. So, there is a single tax rate for the 
corporation and the executive (although the single rate might change over 
time). In this case, employer deductions and employee income always offset 
each other. This is so even if the rate changes so long as corporate and 
individual rates are the same after the change. Declining rates help the 
executive but hurt the corporation because the deduction is less valuable. The 
declining rate has, in fact, reallocated the tax burden from the employee to 
the employer. But it has not increased or decreased total revenues. 
[1-tco ]x[~] x[Fc(N)]= Q 1-t10 !-teN F1(N) 
The after-tax investment comparison is the same. This equation shows how 
structural changes in the tax system might affect the value of NQDC if both rates are 
increasing or decreasing. (If rates are moving in different directions, then the ratios in 
Equation 5 are sufficient.) NQDC has a tax advantage if corporate rates are lower today, 
but the rates are the same at time N. So, if the rate structure is converging, NQDC has an 
advantage if corporate rates are currently lower. It also has an advantage if rates are the 
same today, but individual rates are lower at time N. So, if rates are diverging, NQDC has 
an advantage if individual rates are lower in the future. Since the dynamics of this 
alternate equation would seem to depend more on tax law changes than on the cycles of 
individual or corporate earnings, it reveals less about potential planning. 
93 These three elements have been identified in SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 
214; see also Halperin, supra note 83, at 540 (discussing comparative advantage in after-
tax returns). 
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Next, note how the stability of tax rates affects Q. Suppose tc0=tcN 
Fc(N)=FI(N) and t10=tJN. So, there are two tax rates, one for the corporation 
and one for the executive, and the two rates do not change over time. The 
executive cannot move into a lower tax bracket in the future. The corporation 
cannot move into a higher tax bracket. Here, again, Q= 1, and deferral is not 
valuable. 
3. After-Tax Return Ratio 
The first element of Q highlights the possibility that corporate employers 
can earn greater after-tax investment income than their executives. 
Differences in the comparative abilities to earn after-tax returns might allow 
the employee to shift investment income to the employer. This is a variant of 
the classic problem of personal holding companies, which used the corporate 
rate structure to shield investment income from high personal rates.94 Or, 
corporations might have a greater ability to take advantage of tax preferences 
that apply to investments. For example, corporations can deduct 70% or more 
of the value of corporate dividends received.95 However, the dividends 
received deduction is meager compared to the capital gains preference, which 
is available only to individuals. This and other advantages are discussed 
below. 
Might the corporation have some economies of scale or bargaining 
power over investment management services? These advantages would 
translate into a greater ability to produce after-tax returns. Yet, it is hard to 
imagine how the corporation could not allow the executive to take advantage 
of such economies or power. For example, any investment advisors that the 
corporation might hire could advise on the investment of NQDC or on the 
investment of current compensation. Thus, the focus is on the comparative 
taxation of investments earned by corporations and individuals. 
4. Individual Rate Ratio 
Q's next element highlights the possibility that individual tax rates might 
be falling. The corporation and the executive might have the same ability to 
generate after-tax investment returns. If so, the sole determinants of Q will be 
the marginal corporate and individual rates. If corporate rates and earning 
abilities are constant, then Q is determined solely by individual rates. 
94 See BORIS I. BllTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS para. 7.20 (7th ed. 2004). 
95 See I.R.C. § 246b(3)(A) (2000). 
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The rate decline encourages an executive to shift income into a year with 
a lower tax bracket. The executive can average income over multiple periods. 
Declining individual rates may occur if an executive defers current income 
from prime earning years into retirement. Because taxable income may be 
lower in retirement, the executive may be in a lower bracket. 
Exploiting declining individual rates may be the most serious tax issue of 
NQDC. One simple way of combating it would be to tax all distributions of 
NQDC at the highest marginal rate. If such a rule were adopted, 110 is always 
less than or equal to lm (unless the rates are changed legislatively). 
5. Corporate Rate Ratio 
The final element of Q highlights the possibility that corporate tax rates 
might be increasing. Increasing corporate rates makes deferred compensation 
attractive. If individual rates and earning abilities are constant, then Q is-
1-tco = Q 
1-tCN 
The reason is similar to that for decreasing individual rates. The 
corporate deduction is worth more if taken in a future year when marginal tax 
rates are higher. There may be less of a natural life cycle to corporate 
earnings than to individual earnings. In addition, corporations can carry back 
and carry forward any net losses to years in which they have taxable income. 
Thus, the marginal corporate tax rate in a loss year will not be zero. 
Nonetheless, the marginal corporate tax rate will be lower in a loss year than 
it would be in a profitable year.96 
Code § 162(m) limits the deduction of non-performance-based 
compensation paid to a public company's top five executives.97 The limit is 
$1,000,000. If a corporation is subject to this limit, its marginal tax rate-
with respect to the excess compensation-is essentially zero. By deferring 
compensation until the executive retires, the corporation can then fully 
96 See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text. 
97 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). NQDC is not the only outlet for avoiding § 162(m). 
"Performance-based compensation" over $1 million is always deducted. Many 
practitioners have long viewed this exception as a gaping hole in§ 162(m). The IRS may, 
however, be increasing its scrutiny of§ 162(m) in light of recent corporate scandals. See 
generally Daniel Nelson, Executive Compensation Deduction Limits Revisited, 106 TAX 
NOTES 304, 304 (2005). 
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deduct the amount paid. Thus, by statute, a corporation might face an 
increasing marginal tax rate. 
E. Summary 
This Part has shown that there are three ways in which NQDC can 
generate global tax savings and thus be costly to the fisc. These ways are: 
income averaging by executives, income averaging by corporations, and 
income shifting from executives to corporations. 
Individual income averaging occurs because executives defer current 
salary into future periods. This produces global tax savings when the 
executive's future marginal tax rate is lower than the current rate. Because 
tax rates are progressive and because compensation is typically deferred into 
nonproductive years, individual income averaging appears to be a significant 
problem ofNQDC. 
Corporate income averaging likewise occurs because corporations defer 
current deductions into the future. This produces global tax savings when the 
corporation's future marginal tax rate is higher than the current rate. Tax 
rates for corporations are not as progressive as they are for individuals. 
Moreover, corporations do not have a natural life cycle of earnings as do 
individuals. The most important element of corporate income averaging 
appears to be avoiding the limits on deducting executive compensation over 
$1 million. 
Income shifting from executives to corporations occurs because 
corporations are taxed on interim income from investments. If the 
corporation is subject to a lower effective rate on this income, global tax 
savings result. 
The goal of the next Part is to examine these three elements in light of 
the Code. The conclusion is that individual income averaging and avoiding 
limits on deducting executive compensation are the most likely reasons for 
usingNQDC. 
IV. TAX A VOIDANCE THROUGH DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A. Likelihood ofF a/ling Individual Rates 
The first element to be examined is the ability of executives to shift 
income from high-tax years to low-tax years using NQDC. This homemade 
income averaging is different from the advantages of deferral that come with 
401(k) plans which effectively grant tax exemption on investment income. 
Here the issue is solely comparing the rates in effect currently versus those in 
effect in the future. 
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The federal income tax is progressive, containing six nominal brackets 
ranging from 10% to 35%. The top rate applies to taxable income over 
$326,450 in 2005. 98 These nominal brackets do not, however, accurately 
reflect true marginal income tax rates in the Code. The nominal rates are 
distorted by phase outs of exclusions and distortions at certain levels of 
income.99 Nonetheless, they do provide a reasonable idea of how tax burdens 
increase when taxable income increases. 
An executive might be in a high rate bracket (for example, 35%) in 2005 
but expects to be in a lower bracket (for example, 25%) in later years. He or 
she then has an incentive to defer the receipt of income to the later, low-
bracket year. In their classic article against progressivity, Professors Blum 
and Kalven criticized the progressive rate structure itself on the grounds that 
it encourages this type of tax planning. 100 
This increasing rate structure applies to taxable income, which is 
calculated every taxable year. For most executives and other individuals, the 
taxable year is the calendar year. 101 Time--or at least the calendar year-is 
the common arbitrator for the income tax rate. Before 1986, however, the 
Code expressly allowed some income averaging by taxpayers. 102 The 
sweeping tax changes of 1986 repealed these income averaging provisions 
98 The rates are 10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%. See l.R.C. § l(a}-{c), (i) 
(2000); Rev. Proc. 2004-71 § 3.01, 2004-50 I.R.B. 971. 
99 For example, itemized deductions begin to be phased out after a taxpayer reaches 
$145,950 of adjusted gross income (AGD in 2005. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71 § 3.11, 2004-
50 I.R.B. 971. For every dollar of AGI above this threshold, itemized deductions are 
reduced by 3%. See I.R.C. § 68(a) (2000). This phaseout is tantamount to a 3% increase 
in the marginal income tax rate. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF 
PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE 
PRESIDENT'S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS 37 (Comm. Print, 2001), 
available at http://house.gov/jct/x-6-0l.pdf. So, while the phaseout applies, the 33% rate 
would be equivalent to a 34.99% rate. The phaseout ends after 80% of all itemized 
deductions have been eliminated. I.R.C. § 68(a)(2) (2000). Marginal rates can actually 
decline just after a phaseout has ended. Many other phaseouts exist in the Code beyond 
the one for itemized deductions. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation identified 
twenty-three provisions affecting individual taxpayers that are subject to phaseout. See 
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES 
RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES, tbl. 18, JCX 18-99 (Comm. Print, 1999); JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL 
EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES, JCS-3-98 (Comrn. Print, 1998). 
100 See Walter J. Blum & Harry Ka1ven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 417 (1952) ("It is remarkable how much ofthe day to day 
work of the lawyer in the income tax field derives from the simple fact that the tax is 
progressive."). 
101 See BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 15, at para. 105.2.1. 
102 See id. para. 3.5.5. 
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because the rate structure became so compressed. 103 These averaging 
provisions have not returned, even though the top rates increased and the 
bottom rates fell after 1986.104 
NQDC, however, allows taxpayers to engage in homemade income 
averaging. 105 An executive at a high rate today may defer income to a future 
period when (it is hoped) the rate will be lower. If the executive is always 
subject to the highest rate, however, deferral may bring no relief. In this 
respect, NQDC works in much the same way as income shifting among 
family members. If a mother is in the top rate bracket and her child is in the 
lowest, she has an incentive to shift income to the child. If the mother and 
child are in the same bracket, no such incentive exists. By comparison, 
NQDC shifts income from one period to another. 106 Both involve attempts to 
minimize the impact of the progressive rate structure. 
The assignment of income doctrine limits the ability of taxpayers to shift 
income to other taxpayers. The wellspring for this doctrine is Lucas v. Ear/107 
in which a husband and wife agreed 
that any property either of us now has or may hereafter acquire ... during 
the existence of our marriage .. . and all the proceeds, issues, and profits of 
any and all such property . .. is declared to be received, held, taken, and 
owned by us as joint tenants, and not otherwise, with the right of 
. h. 108 
survtvors tp. 
Justice Holmes said that the agreement would not shift any income tax 
burden from the husband to his wife. He said that 
[t)here is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned 
them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory 
arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary 
when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That 
I03 See id (citing Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 
(1986)). 
I04 See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 419-20 {2003). 
105 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 83, at 549; see also JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., 
fuNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 658 {13th ed. 2004) {presenting Rev. 
Rul. 60-31 under the heading "Do-It-Yourself Averaging"). 
I 06 An interpersonal shift also occurs between the employer and employee with 
respect to interim investment income. 
107 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, 111 (1930). 
108 Id at 113-14. The couple made this agreement before the income tax arose. 
Thus, they were not intending to lower their tax bill, but were seeking the benefits of 
accidental planning. 
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seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no 
distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement 
by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they 
109 grew. 
The fruit-and-tree analogy of Lucas v. Earl has deeply shaped the tax 
jurisprudence of assignment of earned income. 110 Income from personal 
services is "fruit." The person who performed the services is the "tree." 
Despite its richness, the fruit-tree metaphor is not always loved by tax 
scholars, who rightly recognize the danger of extending it carelessly.'" 
Outside its purview of intrafamily assignments of earned income, the 
metaphor loses its vigor and can produce strange results. 112 Nonetheless, a 
seasonal extension of the metaphor is worthy of consideration. 
Perhaps the taxpayer is not just a fruit bearing tree, but is "like a tree 
planted by the streams of water, that yields its fruit in its season."113 Lucas v. 
Earl focuses on assigning fruit to tree. NQDC, however, allows this year's 
fruit to count toward a future harvest. Why has the law not responded to this 
temporal shift the way it responded to personal shifts in Lucas v. Earn 
Professor Marvin Chirelstein briefly but insightfully ponders this 
inconsistency in his short treatise. He says, 
[I]t may still be of some interest-perhaps only archaeological-to ask why 
the Commissioner should have succeeded so well . . . in preventing the 
assignment of earned income to other taxable persons, while largely failing 
to prevent the assignment of such income to other taxable periods . ... The 
answer, most probably, is that the question of taxable person was not 
thought to be constrained by accounting rules to the same degree as the 
question of taxable period. [With assignments to other persons], the courts 
and the Service were at liberty to invent rules of income attribution under 
the general authority of § 61. By contrast, the taxpayer [with NQDC] could 
draw support from the cash method itself, which apparently contains no 
intrinsic distinction between short-term, involuntary deferrals and deferrals 
109 Id. 
110 See BmKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, para. 75.2.1. 
111 See, e.g., Traci A. Sammeth, Note, Beyond the Fruit Tree: A Proposal for the 
Revision of the Assignment of Income Doctrine--Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 
644 (5th Cir. 1989), 65 WASH. L. REv. 229,240 (1990); Lauren E. Sheridan, Note, Trees 
in the Orchard or Fruit from the Trees?: The Case for Excluding Attorneys' Contingent 
Fees from the Client's Gross Income, 36 GA. L. REv. 283,309 (2001). 
11 2 Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent 
Attorney's Fee Arrangements: Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REV. 57, 
59-63 (2002). 
113 Psalms 1 :3. 
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which are extended and also prearranged. To tax both currently, however, 
would virtually be to abrogate the cash method of accounting. More 
generally, it may simply be that the courts have intuitively favored the idea 
of self-help income-averaging-which does, after all, appeal to one's sense 
of equity-while viewing income-splitting as a dangerous avoidance device 
and one with a wide potential for mischief. 114 
375 
This is surely correct as a matter of doctrine, but the economics of 
personal and temporal income shifting are indistinguishable. Assignments of 
income allow high-rate taxpayers to shift income to low-rate taxpayers. 
NQDC allows taxpayers to shift income from high-rate years to low-rate 
years. Moreover, such shifts are likely to produce tax savings in practice. 
Executives (other than the very wealthiest) are very likely to face higher tax 
rates when they earn money than when they receive it via NQDC. The only 
limits are the modest control and security limitations of Code § 409A and 
economic benefit and constructive receipt doctrines. 
B. Likelihood of Rising Corporate Tax Rates 
As we have seen, executives have a systematic incentive to shift income 
to future periods. This incentive favors the use of NQDC. Do corporations 
have an incentive to shift deductions into future periods? If so, this would 
favor the use of NQDC as well. As we will see, there is no clear incentive to 
do this, except when payments are made to a top executive. 
The marginal rate structure for corporations is less complicated than for 
individuals. The rate is 35% for taxable income of $18,333,333 or more. 
Most profitable public companies will be subject to this rate. The rate 
fluctuates between 34% and 39% for taxable income between $75,000 and 
$18,333,333. Rates of 15% and 25% apply at or below income of$75,000. 115 
114 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272-73 (9th ed. 
2002); cf I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-43-00 l (July 30, 1982) (refusing to apply assignment-
of-income doctrine to deferred compensation). 
liS I.R.S., 2004 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1120 AND 1120-A, at 21. The brackets are 
as follows: 
Rate From To 
15% $0.00 $50,000.00 
25% $50,000.00 $75,000.00 
34% $75,000.00 $100,000.00 
39% $100,000.00 $335,000.00 
34% $335,000.00 $10,000,000.00 
35% $10,000,000.00 $15,000,000.00 
38% $15,000,000.00 $18,333,333.00 
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A tentative candidate for deferral might be unprofitable corporations. 
This is somewhat counterfactual, because NQDC is used by almost all large 
corporations (profitable and unprofitable).116 Nonetheless, NQDC might be 
particularly costly when used by unprofitable ones. 
If a corporation's deductions exceed its gross income, it has incurred a 
"net operating Ioss"ll7 For example, if deductions are $20 million and gross 
income is $5 million, the net operating loss is $15 million. The net operating 
loss essentially represents negative taxable income.118 The corporation may 
carry the net operating loss back to the prior two taxable years or forward to 
the subsequent twenty taxable years.119 However, the IRS does not pay 
interest on refunds or tax reductions due to net operating losses. 
The provisions for net operating losses actually reduce the imperative for 
NQDC. 120 This is because the net operating loss is an alternate income-
averaging method. Purely refundable and purely nomefundable corporate 
taxes-both of which are hypothetical-can illustrate the stakes involved. 
Suppose that the tax rate is 35%. Under a purely refundable tax, a current net 
loss of $1 million would result in a refund of $350,000. Thus, the marginal 
rate is 35%, whether or not the corporation is profitable. Under a purely non-
refundable tax, a current net loss of $1 million would result in no refund at 
all. Thus, the marginal rate for an unprofitable corporation is 0%, and the 
marginal rate for a profitable corporation is 35%. 
In the real world, a net operating loss (i.e., negative taxable income) may 
be carried back two years and carried forward twenty years under current 
law. 121 In one scenario, net operating losses make the system purely 
refundable. Suppose that the corporation can carry its current loss back to a 
prior, profitable year. Its current marginal tax rate would equal its marginal 
rate in the prior year when the loss is used. 122 This rate may well be 34% or 
35% $18,333,333.00 
The uncouth 39% and 38% brackets are "bubble brackets" that phase out the 
advantages of lower marginal rates. See generally I.R.C. § ll(b)(1) (2000); BITIKER & 
EUSTICE, supra note 94, para. 5.01[1]. 
116 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
ll7 See I.R.C. § 172( d) (2000). Net operating losses are more important to 
corporations than to individuals for two reasons. First, a corporation is more likely to 
have deductions that exceed income. Second, the deductions that go into calculating a net 
operating loss for an individual are more limited than for a corporation. See I.R.C. 
§ 172(d)(4){2000); BITIKER& EUSTICE, supra note 94, para. 5.03[4]. 
liS See BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 15, para. 25.1 0.1. 
119 See l.R.C. § 172(b)(l)(A)(2000). 
120 But cf Halperin, supra note 83, at 540, 552 (contending that net operating losses 
reduce marginal corporate rates and make NQDC more attractive). 
121 See I.R.C. § 172(b)(l)(A)(2000). 
122 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 187 ("Scenario 1 "). 
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35%. In effect, such a corporation is operating under a purely refundable 
system and a marginal rate of 34% or 35%. 
Outside this scenario, net operating losses make the system partially 
refundable. Suppose that the unprofitable corporation must carry forward its 
loss. Thus, its current effective rate of tax is its marginal rate in the future 
year when the loss will ultimately be used, but discounted for time value of 
money. 123 For example, assume the loss is used in five years. Let the discount 
rate be 5% and the future year rate be 35%. The effective marginal rate in the 
current year is about 27%. 124 The result is the same if the corporation is 
currently profitable, but its current profits are being consumed by net 
operating losses that it carried forward from the past. 
Under narrow assumptions, net operating losses may even reduce the 
effective marginal rate of a currently profitable corporation that has no net 
operating losses. The reason is that future losses might be carried back to the 
current year and fully offset current income. This would only occur when the 
future losses occur within two years125 and the future losses equal or exceed 
current income. Even under these narrow circumstances, the effect on the 
current marginal rate of effective taxation may be small. 126 
In short, net operating losses push the corporate tax toward a refundable 
system, thereby increasing the effective marginal tax rate on unprofitable 
corporations. Essentially, the provisions for net operating losses tend to 
smooth the tax rates faced by companies, raising them in unprofitable years 
and perhaps even lowering them in profitable years. As a result, there is a 
weakened incentive for an unprofitable corporation to shift its deductions to a 
future (and hopefully profitable) year. 
There is, however, a strong incentive to defer the compensation of the 
top five executives of publicly held companies. In general, a publicly held 
company cannot deduct compensation over $1 million paid to one of its top 
five officers. 127 A major exception to this rule exempts certain performance-
123 See id. at 187 ("Scenario 2"). 
124 See id. at 189 ("Scenario 4"). 
125 See I.R.C. § 172(b )(I )(A)(i) (2000). 
126 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 188-89 ("Scenario 3"). Consider a 
corporation that has $5 million of income in year one, has $10 million of losses in year 
three, and has $10 million of income in year six. In every other year, it breaks even (no 
income or loss). An additional dollar of income in year one allows for an additional dollar 
to be used in year two as a loss carryback. However, such use means that one less dollar 
will be ultimately used in year five. Let the discount rate be 5% and the statutory rate be 
35%. Here, the effective marginal rate for year one is about 31%. 
127 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)(2000). 
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based compensation. 128 The $1 million limit applies to compensation paid to 
the executive if he or she is one of the top five executives during the taxable 
year of payment. 129 So, no limit applies to compensation paid in years after 
the executive is no longer in the top five group. As a result, public companies 
often require executives to defer any base salary over $1 million. 130 
An incentive might also exist to defer compensation if the corporation 
must wait to deduct the compensation anyway. If that is the case, then the 
corporation is not losing the immediate deduction by deferring. The most 
likely situation in which this would happen is when the corporation must 
capitalize compensation expense. Doctrinally, the capitalization of 
compensation expense is unclear, but should certainly occur under the right 
circumstances (e.g., the executive is working solely on the acquisition of 
another company). As a practical matter, compensation is probably not 
capitalized very often. 131 
Unlike executives, corporations do not face a systematic likelihood that 
deferral will lower their tax bills. Even if the corporation is currently 
unprofitable, the use of net operating losses dampens any incentive to shift 
deductions to the future. One area in which there is a strong incentive is in 
the payment of compensation to the top five executives of a public company. 
Payments over $1 million are nondeductible. Thus, corporations would like 
to defer these payments (essentially averaging them) into periods when the 
recipient is no longer an executive and no longer subject to the limits. 
C. Comparative Taxation of Investment Income 
If corporations face lower rates on investment income, then executives 
could enjoy these lower rates as well through NQDC. Taxation of earnings at 
the corporate and shareholder level does not, however, disadvantage 
corporations in the provision of NQDC. Any income earned by the 
corporation to fund deferred compensation will not be distributed (and taxed) 
to shareholders. Stated a different way, the executive's claim is as a creditor, 
not as a shareholder. 
For example, suppose we lived in a world with the following rates-
Executives (compensation income) 35% 
Shareholders (corporate distributions) 35% 
128 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C} (2000). Stock options are often designed to fall within 
this exception. 
129 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(3) (2000). 
130 See SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 41 , para. 2.02(4)(a). 
13 1 See I.R.C. § 263A (2000); Wells Fargo & Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 224 
F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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Corporations (corporate income) 30% 
Deferred compensation is still feasible, even though corporate income is 
subject to double taxation. Here, investment income is taxed to the 
corporation at 30%, but to the executive at 35%. This differential provides an 
incentive to NQDC. Suppose that the corporation sets aside funds, invests 
them, and pays 30% tax on the annual income. In the future, it pays out the 
funds to the executive. The shareholders are not implicated directly in this 
transaction. In essence, the corporation acts as a holding company for the 
executive with respect to NQDC. The shareholders and their tax rates are 
irrelevant. The only relevant measures are the tax rates of the corporation and 
the executive. 
As for what is relevant, the rate structures for high-income executives 
and for profitable corporations look the same. Both are subject to statutory 
rates of 34% or 35%. Additional preferences or loopholes might, however, 
give one side a comparative advantage. Indeed, Professor Daniel Halperin 
argues for a special tax on employers that offer NQDC. 132 Halperin's premise 
is that the income shift to employers would allow for the sheltering of 
investment income. 133 Halperin notes that the deductions for dividends 
received by corporations 134 and the use of net operating losses. 135 
Corporations do enjoy reduced statutory rates on dividends. The 
dividends received deduction is a licit "shelter" that may give the 
employer/corporation some investment advantage. A corporation receives a 
deduction for at least 70% of the dividends received from another domestic 
corporation. 136 All of the dividends are deductible if received from a close 
affiliate of the payee (e.g., a subsidiary) or from a small business investment 
company. 137 As executives usually cannot invest in close affiliates of the 
employer, the relevant deduction is 70%. 
Where the marginal corporate tax is 35%, the marginal rate on dividend 
income will be 1 0.5%. This appears to be a significant advantage when one 
132 See Halperin, supra note 83, at 539-50. 
l33 Part of Halperin's concern was that plans maintained by nongovernmental, tax-
exempt organizations were not regulated. Jd. at 540. These plans are now, however, 
covered by the strictures of Code § 457. But cf Daniel Halperin, Letter to the Editor, 
Section 457 Should Be Replaced by a Special Tax on Investment Income, 100 TAX NOTES 
730, 730 (2003) (arguing that special investment tax should apply to all deferred 
compensation plans). 
134 The deduction was then 85% but is now 70%. See I.R.C. § 243(a)(l) (2000). 
135 Halperin, supra note 83, at 552. 
136 See I.R.C. § 243(a){l) (2000). 
137 See I.R.C. § 243(a)(2)-{3), (b}(l)-{2) (2000). 
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recalls that individuals pay a rate of 15% on dividends.138 However, the 
dividend yield on public companies is far less than the return from capital 
appreciation. 139 Individuals-but not corporations--enjoy a 15% tax on long-
term capital appreciation, whereas corporations are taxed at their ordinary 
rate (e.g., 34% or 35%).140 Overall, then, corporations appear to be 
comparatively disadvantaged in the area of equity investing. 
Net operating losses were discussed in the previous section, where it was 
argued that unprofitable corporations had less incentive to shift deductions to 
the future. The reason is that net operating losses tend to raise marginal rates 
in unprofitable years by making losses partially refundable. For the same 
reason, executives have less incentive to shift investment income to 
unprofitable corporate employers. Again, allowing net operating losses 
dampens the incentive for income shifting. 
Quantifying effective marginal tax rates in light of net operating losses 
and other factors is a challenge. The legal literature contains efforts at 
describing the average tax rates paid by corporations. 141 The relevant 
measure for NQDC is, however, the marginal tax rate-how costly is it for a 
corporation to receive an extra dollar of income? Financial economists have 
tried to estimate the rates. 142 For large public companies, data compiled by 
economist John Graham suggest that the effective marginal tax rate is around 
30% to 35%. 143 This result, when compared with the 15% capital gains rate 
for individuals, suggests that, at least for large corporations, executives 
should be able to earn higher after-tax returns than their corporate employers. 
A secondary advantage of investments held by an individual is the basis 
step up rules of Code § 1014. Under the step up rules, the tax basis of an 
138 See I.R.C. § l(h)(l)(c) (2000). However, the 15% rate and the preference for 
dividends are set to expire at the end of 2008 .. Then, capital gains will be subject to a 20% 
rate, and dividends will become subject to ordinary income rates. See Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 758 (2003); 
BIITKER & LoKKEN, supra note 15, para. 46.2.3 n.l2. 
139 See Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis Indexation: Tax Arbitrage and Related 
Issues, 55 TAX L. REv. 69, 85 n.66 (2001). 
140 Compare I.R.C. § l(h)(l)(c) (2000) (limiting individual capital gains to 15%) 
with I.R.C. § 11 (2000) (providing no preference for capital gains earned by a 
corporation). 
141 See, e.g., George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?: 
Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REv. 1793 (2003). 
142 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 210 (citing sources). 
143 See Courtney H. Edwards et al., Employee Stock Options and Taxes, J. 
INVESTMENT MGMT., 2d quarter 2006, at 1, tbl. II, available at 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-jgraharn/website/StockOpTaxes%20JOIM%20galleys.pdf. 
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asset equals its fair market value as of the owner's death. 144 This is 
essentially government-provided life insurance to investors. The amount of 
the insurance is the tax bill on any unrealized appreciation in investment 
assets owned by the executive. The tax bill is not forgiven if the 
"investment" is in NQDC, which is treated as compensation (not as an 
investment). Thus, NQDC does not receive a step up in basis, and is fully 
taxable as income in respect of a decedent. 145 
All of this is presented as a prima facie case that corporations have no tax 
advantage in investing. Proving this point definitively might be nearly 
impossible. A corporation might conceivably have an advantage in equity 
investing because of the realization requirement and differing cash flow 
needs. For example, we have assumed all along that the corporation will set 
aside assets to pay NQDC and sell those assets when its obligation becomes 
due. The corporation may, however, be able to pay the NQDC obligation 
using other sources, and might even keep the assets set aside for the next 
generation of executives. The conceptual point is that the corporation might 
not need to sell the set aside asset upon payout to the executive. If some other 
use can be found for the asset, then the corporation could conceivably hold 
the asset-and defer its own tax bill-indefinitely. 
Moreover, tax shelters could conceivably (but may not inevitably) affect 
the marginal tax rate. A classic corporate tax shelter reduces taxes due 
without a significant reduction in economic income. 146 Thus, where taxes are 
expressed as a percentage of economic income, tax shelters reduce the 
average tax rate. Unless tax shelters push the corporation into a lower tax 
bracket, tax shelters may not reduce marginal rates at all. Perhaps the 
appetite for shelters is related to the amount of taxable income the 
corporation would otherwise have. Corporate tax shelters are thus an issue if 
the extra income from NQDC "allows" a corporation to engage in more 
shelter activities, which would lower the marginal tax rate. 
The strongest shelter-based argument against NQDC is that corporations 
can too easily shelter investment income. For example, corporate-owned life 
144 See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (2000). If the estate was subject to estate tax, the relevant 
time may be six months after date if elected by the executor. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(2) 
(2000). 
145 See Treas. Reg. § 1.69l(a)-{b) (2005); John G. Steinkamp, Identification of 
Income in Respect of a Decedent: The Case for Using Assignment of Income Precedents, 
46 DEPAUL L. REv. 367, 384 (1997). 
146 Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1503 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a tax shelter as a 
"financial operation or investment strategy (such as a partnership or real-estate 
investment trust) that is created primarily for the purpose of reducing or deferring 
income-tax payments"). 
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insurance (COLI) is a common method for funding NQDC, 147 but also 
prominent as a tax shelter in its own right. 148 COLI is life insurance, owned 
by the corporation, on the lives of employees. Because policy proceeds and 
inside investment gains on the policy are tax free, COLI essentially allows 
the corporation to shelter investment income from taxation. 149 COLI policies 
are often taken out on all (or many) employees, prompting some to call COLI 
"dead janitors" or "dead peasants" insurance.150 The large number of insured 
allows for much more frequent payments of the tax-free policy proceeds. 
There is some debate over whether the tax savings of COLI are captured 
mainly by the employer or by the insurer.151 Presumably, there is some 
efficiency in COLI to explain its widespread use. If so, NQDC may well 
represent a way for executives to share in the tax advantages of COLI. COLI 
works because it covers a wide group of employees. The executive could not 
purchase this type of policy directly, because the executive would not have 
an insurable interest. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to say that the problem is 
with COLI itself, which is exploited in ways other than through NQDC. 
In short, however, most of the structural aspects of the Code suggest that 
individuals have an advantage over corporations in earning investment 
returns. Individuals receive an enormous preference for capital gains, and 
also receive a step up in basis upon death. Moreover, empirical data suggest 
that large corporations pay marginal tax of around 35%. The primary 
advantage of corporations might be their ability to engage in tax shelter 
transactions. To be relevant to NQDC, tax shelters would have to reduce 
marginal, not average tax rate. COLI is the most likely candidate for such a 
shelter. But, if COLI is a tax policy problem, it should be analyzed and 
remedied separately. 
147 See Clark Consulting, supra note 4, at 20 (reporting that 61% of respondents 
used COLI to fund NQDC when they do fund the plans). 
148 See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX 
L. REv. 255, 255-57 (2002). The classic COLI shelter involved purchasing the policy 
with borrowed funds. The borrowing produced interest deductions, while the policy 
produced tax free proceeds. This is essentially arbitrage, producing a gain because of the 
cost of borrowing is cheaper than the amounts received. The Code now contains some 
limits on this arrangement. See I.R.C. § 264 (2000). 
149 Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial 
Scheme that Takes Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 653, 
665-71 (2004). 
150 See Michael J. Henke, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Meets the Texas 
Insurable Interest Requirement: A Train Wreck in Progress, 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 51, 63 
n.66 (2003) (describing corporate-owned life insurance as "dead peasant" or "dead 
janitor" policies). 
151 See Martin, supra note 149, at 666. 
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D. Summary 
Three plausible tax reasons exist for using NQDC. Executives might 
shift their income from high-tax years to low-tax years. In other words, they 
might average their income. Corporations might shift their deductions from 
low-tax years to high-tax years. Again, they might average their income. 
Finally, executives can shift investment income from themselves to their 
employers. 
Only two reasons are compelling. First, NQDC gives lower- and middle-
level executives an opportunity for income averaging. These are the 
executives who might expect to be in a lower tax bracket upon retirement. 
Second, NQDC allows the corporation to avoid the limits of Code § 162(m) 
in compensating its top five executives. This is a limited type of income 
averaging by the corporation. 
Beyond avoiding Code § 162(m), corporations probably do not use 
NQDC to average their own income. If general corporate income averaging 
were prominent, then NQDC would be used primarily by less profitable 
corporations. Almost all public corporations, however, use NQDC. 
Moreover, unprofitable corporations can defer deductions (but without 
interest) using net operating losses. Income shifting from executives to 
corporations is not a compelling explanation either. Such shifting would save 
taxes only when corporations enjoy lower marginal effective rates. The 
enormous tax preference for capital gains, which is available only to 
individuals, belies this explanation. Empirical research on marginal corporate 
tax rates does not support it either. 
V. REFORM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A. Inadequacy of Current Doctrine and Prior Reforms 
In governing NQDC, the tax laws look to constructive receipt and 
economic benefit. Constructive receipt limits the degree of control that an 
executive may have while deferring taxation. Economic benefit limits the 
degree of security an executive may have while deferring taxation. Thus, 
NQDC cannot be tailored to every risk preference, as there must be limits on 
the executive's control and security. As a result, these doctrines make NQDC 
less attractive at the margin, and may control any cost to the fisc that comes 
from NQDC. Neither doctrine, however, addresses the interplay of corporate 
and executive tax rates that determines the costs ofNQDC. 
Recent reforms show that regulatory focus is still on security and control. 
Code§ 409A was enacted in October 2004 in order to tighten the control and 
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security limitations of prior law. 152 Two common NQDC techniques were 
banned. One was the so-called haircut distribution, which allowed an 
executive to withdraw benefits at will subject to a small forfeiture. The other 
was offshore rabbi trusts, which burdened the ability of general creditors to 
reach the assets of rabbi trusts. 
Many employers, including Enron, designed NQDC plans that allowed 
an executive to withdraw benefits at any time, so long as the executive 
forfeited a portion, for example 10%, of his or her benefits (thus the 
haircut). 153 In fact, the Enron executives who took distributions on the eve of 
bankruptcy did so under the authority of a haircut provision. 154 Of course, 
these Enron executives had taxable income on withdrawal. They had actual 
receipt of income. It is the rights left unexercised that implicate constructive 
receipt. So, the question is why they did not have constructive receipt of 
income in an earlier year-when they could have, but did not, take a 
distribution. The theory was that the 10% forfeiture was a restriction on the 
executive that would prevent immediate taxation under constructive 
receipt. 155 Although it was not clear whether this strategy would have 
survived IRS challenge under prior law, Code§ 409A clearly disallows it. 
Code § 409A also clarified the amount of risk to which an executive 
could be exposed. To reduce credit risk, some corporations established rabbi 
trusts in offshore (non-U.S.) jurisdictions.156 The theory behind these moves 
was that an effective rabbi trust need only make its assets available to 
general, unsecured creditors if the employer becomes insolvent or bankrupt. 
They do not need to be easily or readily available. The creditors would still 
need to get a judgment against the rabbi trust, and doing so would be 
152 Code § 409A is highly influenced by Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 and 
Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428. 
153 See SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 41, § 7.04[2]; Clark Consulting, supra note 4, 
at 22 (reporting that 56% of their respondents allowed haircut distributions). 
154 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INvESTIGATION OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION 
ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 621-25 (JCS-3-03 2003). 
155 Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2005) ("However, income is not constructively 
received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or 
restrictions."). Often, such withdrawal rights were subject to the administrative discretion 
of the employer or its appointed committee. In theory, the discretion prevented any 
withdrawal right from being considered unqualified and thus subject to constructive 
receipt. Cf Metcalfe v. Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. 1393 (1982) (holding that discretionary 
withdrawal rights do not trigger constructive receipt even if routinely granted). It was 
thought that this discretion added another layer of protection against a charge by the IRS 
of constructive receipt. 
156 See generally Beckett G. Cantley, The New Congressional Attack on Offshore 
Rabbi Trusts, 5 OR. REv.INT'L L. 5, 8-11 (2003). 
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cumbersome if the trust were in a foreign jurisdiction. 157 The hope, of course, 
was that the creditors would not bother, and the executives would keep their 
benefits even if the corporation became insolvent or went bankrupt. Starting 
on January 1, 2005, offshore rabbi-trusts do trigger current taxation (unless 
the services were actually performed offshore). 158 
A more comprehensive (but unsuccessful) reform was proposed in 1978. 
In that year, the IRS proposed accrual taxation on elective deferrals of 
compensation. The proposed regulations said that 
If .. . payment of an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular compensation 
fixed by contract, statute, or otherwise (or supplements to such 
compensation, such as bonuses, or increases in such compensation) is, at the 
taxpayer's individual option, deferred to a taxable year later than that in 
which such amount would have been payable but for his exercise of such 
option, the amount shall be treated as received by the taxpayer in such 
earlier taxable year. For purposes of this paragraph, it is immaterial that the 
taxpayer's rights in the amount payment of which is so deferred become 
forfeitable by reason of his exercise of the option to defer payment. 159 
The proposed regulations looked to whether deferral was at the 
employee's option. If so, the employee would be taxed immediately. A 
factual question would have existed as to whether deferral was at the 
employee's option. 160 The proposed regulations would have implemented an 
internal IRS proposal, made a year earlier, that would have taxed employees 
who exercised "dominion and control" over deferred compensation.161 The 
proposal looked to the historic assignment of income cases for analogy. 
The proposed regulations were issued on February 3, 1978 and sparked 
immediate opposition from employers and their lobbyists. Congress quickly 
and emphatically killed the proposal. Section 132 of the Revenue Act of 
1978 states that NQDC will be taxed according to "the principles set forth in 
regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions relating to deferred compensation 
157 See Gerald R. Nowotny, Securing Nonqualified Deferred Compensation and 
Executive Benefits Using Offshore Rabbi Trusts, 6 J. TAX'N EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 226, 
227-30 (1999). 
158 See I.R.C. § 409A(b)(l) (2000). 
159 Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.61-16 (2005), 43 Fed. Reg. 4638, 4639 (Feb. 3, 1978). The 
proposed regulations would not have affected qualified retirement plans. 
160 A parallel question exists with qualified retirement plans. A 40 I (k) plan is a 
qualified retirement plan with a cash or deferred arrangement (CODA). A CODA allows 
employees to elect between current compensation or contributions to their qualified 
retirement plans. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.401(k)-l(a)(3)(i)-l(a)(4) (2005). 
16l I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,998 (Feb. 9, 1977); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
37,014 (Feb. 25, 1977). 
HeinOnline -- 67 Ohio St. L.J. 386 2006
386 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:347 
which were in effect on February 1, 1978."162 This went beyond simply 
undoing the proposed regulations. The 1978 Act also ossified the law of 
constructive receipt by prohibiting the IRS from reversing any of its prior 
rulings. 163 The passage of Code § 409A has effectively freed the IRS and 
Treasury to regulate NQDC. Because Code § 409A clearly contemplates 
elective deferrals by executives, however, the 1978 proposed regulations will 
not be coming back without further legislation. 
Obviously, the theory behind the 1978 proposed regulations was the 
same as the assignment of income. Nonetheless, it was actually not broad 
enough in applying this theory. By limiting itself to elective deferrals, the 
proposed regulations would have encouraged taxpayers to disguise NQDC so 
as to make it look nonelective. Electiveness would have likely joined control 
and security as the things to avoid in planning NQDC. Thus, the 1978 
proposed regulations would have had the same effect as Code § 409A-
restricting the types of arrangements that qualify for tax deferral. What is 
needed is a regime that taxes NQDC no more favorably than current 
compensation. This goal of tax neutrality is the next topic. 
B. Goal ofTax Neutrality 
NQDC can be contrasted with the U.S. system for qualified retirement 
plans. Such plans receive an express-and expensive-subsidy. 164 
Executives and other employees cannot, however, save unlimited amounts 
through qualified retirement plans. These plans must cover rank-and-file 
employees on a nondiscriminatory basis and are subject to benefit limitations 
and caps, which executives often hit. Thus, one could view these benefit caps 
and limitations as the limits on federal tax policy encouraging savings. 
Any tax advantage for NQDC may actually discourage the establishment 
and maintenance of qualified retirement plans. A policy goal of qualified 
retirement plans is to ensure some coerced savings by lower-paid workers. 165 
The assumption is that highly compensated employees more greatly value 
subsidy than do lower-paid workers. This is because they can afford more 
savings and because they are in higher tax brackets. Highly compensated 
162 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § l32(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2782. 
163 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF THE 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND 
COMPANY-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF ENRON CORPORATION AND 
RELATED ENTITIES 16,23 (JCX-36-03 Apr. 7, 2003). 
164 See Part II. C. 
165 See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement 
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It 
Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. I, 3 (1993). 
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employees cannot tap into the subsidy without giving some benefits to lower-
paid workers. Giving a tax advantage to NQDC would undercut the policy 
goals behind qualified retirement plans. 166 Correcting any tax advantages to 
NQDC should be sufficient to ensure that the subsidy for qualified plans 
works properly. 
So, NQDC should receive no tax advantage when compared with current 
compensation. But should it be disadvantaged? Doing so would appear to 
interfere with the commercial relationship between executive and 
corporation. For about a century, employers have given pensions to their 
employees, 167 even though they have not always received tax advantages. 
Professor Steven Balsam gives the following reasons for the use of NQDC 
(and pensions generally): 
1. NQDC can be structured to vest after a certain time, or can have 
backloaded formulae that give the highest benefits in later years. 
2. NQDC encourages executives to stay with the employer. 
3. Since NQDC are unfunded promises to pay, they temper the incentives 
to aggressive risk taking that stock options might otherwise give executives. 
For similar reasons, NQDC encourages executives to care about the 
employer's long-term stability. 
4. NQDC can be structured as a "bond on performance" which can be 
forfeited for rnisconduct. 168 
Often, corporations will give executives a premium for deferring 
compensation, perhaps in order to align the interests of executives and 
corporations in the ways just listed. The premium comes through above-
market rates of return to NQDC investments. Indeed, corporations often give 
a "private subsidy" to NQDC that mimics the government's subsidy of 
qualified retirement plans. 
The existence of above-market returns plays into rent-seeking theories of 
NQDC. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue that public 
companies use NQDC to "camouflage" excessive executive compensation. 169 
According to their rent-seeking model, executives at public companies have 
wide latitude to set their own compensation. Shareholders are too weak to 
challenge executive pay. Boards of directors do not face any significant 
166 Cf Albertson's, Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 F.3d 537, 545-546 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(observing that tax advantages for NQDC would undercut Congressional policy behind 
qualified plans). 
167 JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 
3-17 (3d ed. 2000). 
168 See STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 181-84 
(2002). 
I 69 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 9-107 
(2004). 
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financial or legal consequences by failing to challenge excessive pay. 
Because of cronyism or lack of acumen, directors comply with executives' 
requests for excessive pay. Finally, overpaid executives can use the 
structures of corporate law to prevent a hostile takeover, which might 
otherwise restrain excessive compensation. 
These outside forces will remain inert unless executive compensation is 
perceived to be outrageous. An outrageous level of executive compensation 
will harm the reputations of the executives and complicit directors. It might 
also draw the ire of institutional investors. And, it might attract more interest 
from potential buyers in the hostile takeover market. 
In order to avoid public outrage, executives will try to camouflage their 
total compensation. Under the rent-seeking model, camouflage is often the 
primary reason for the use of NQDC, along with equity-based compensation 
(like stock options), post-retirement perks, and post-retirement consulting 
arrangements. These compensation devices arguably obscure (or 
camouflage) the total level of executive compensation. 170 Bebchuk and Fried 
see a pattern that supports their theory of camouflaged compensation: 
Although firms often provide pensions and deferred compensation to lower-
level employees, they do so only to the extent that these arrangements 
receive a tax subsidy. This pattern suggests that, absent such a subsidy, 
pensions and deferred compensation are generally not efficient. 171 
This point is problematic for several reasons. ERISA effectively limits 
NQDC participation to "a select group of management or highly 
compensated employees."172 Employees outside of this group cannot 
participate. Even if they could, they probably would not be interested, as 
most lower-level employees do not fully avail themselves of their 
opportunity to participate in qualified retirement plans. 173 Because qualified 
retirement plans are superior to NQDC 174 and because lower-level employees 
are not fully contributing to their qualified retirement plans, there is no 
reason to extend NQDC coverage to lower-level employees (even if doing so 
were legal). 
Bebchuk and Fried appear to be asserting that NQDC is offered only to 
executive rent-seekers. They do not, however, define this group. Perhaps it is 
170 Bebchuk and Fried bifurcate NQDC between supplement executive retirement 
plans (SERPs) and deferred compensation. See id. at 95; see also infra notes 180--82 
(discussing deferred compensation and SERPs). 
171 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 169, at 95. 
172 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
173 See, e.g., Norman P. Stein, Deferred Compensation: An Alphabet Soup Agenda 
for Reform of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA Provisions Applicable to Qualified 
Deferred Compensation Plans, 56 SMU L. REv. 627, 659 (2003). 
174 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 29, at 212. 
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the top five or ten executives of a corporation. For example, the SEC requires 
detailed compensation disclosures for a security issuer's top five executives 
(the CEO and four other most highly compensated employees). 175 As to these 
executives, corporations have a strong interest in deferring their pay. For the 
top five officers of a public company, compensation over $1 million is not 
deductible. 176 Abundant techniques allow corporations to avoid this 
restriction. One of these is to defer taxable income to years in which the 
executive would otherwise make under $1 million in compensation or would 
not be one of the top five executives. 177 
Often, the goal with NQDC is not to limit participation to the top five or 
ten executives. 178 Rather, it is to expand participation, occasionally in ways 
that might violate the ERISA precept that NQDC be open only to a select 
group of management or highly compensated employees. Because NQDC is 
exempt from the vesting, funding, and fiduciary rules of ERISA, disgruntled 
participants will sometimes challenge NQDC on the grounds that 
participation is too wide. 179 If participation was not sufficiently limited to the 
top hat group, then the exemptions will no longer apply. 
The breadth of NQDC coverage can be illustrated by two standard plan 
designs. For example, NQDC often gives extra benefits to an employee 
whose qualified plan benefits are subject to the limits of Code § 401(a)(17) 
or§ 415.180 The§ 401(a)(17) limit applies to any employee who makes more 
than $210,000 in 2005. 181 Consider a qualified defined benefit plan that gives 
175 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2005). This information is found in the issuer's annual 
proxy or annual report. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm' n, Executive 
Compensation: A Guide for Investors, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/execomp0803.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Executive Compensation, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
176 See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). 
177 See BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, at para. 64.6 ("[T]he deduction 
limitation does not apply to amounts earned under a nonqualified deferred compensation 
agreement while an employee was a covered employee if the employee is not covered 
when the compensation is paid (e.g., after retirement).") Performance-based pay and 
stock options are also exempt. See id. 
178 See Bronstein & Levin, supra note 7, at 216. For example, Enron Corporation 
offered NQDC participation to about 300 of its employees. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, supra note 154, at 604. 
179 See, e.g. , Demery v. Extebank Deferred Compensation Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
l80 Such plans are usually called Supplement Executive Retirement Plans (or 
SERPs). They are very common. See Clark Consulting, supra note 4, at 26 (reporting that 
83% of respondents have SERPs). 
181 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-127 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
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an employee a pension at age sixty-five equal to one-percent times final 
average pay times years of service. An employee who makes $400,000 per 
year and has thirty years of service would have earned a pension equal to 
$120,000 per year ifCode § 401(a)(17) did not apply. However, § 401(a)(17) 
prohibits the qualified plan from counting compensation over $210,000. So, 
the pension for the hypothetical employee is limited to $63,000 per year. A 
standard NQDC design would give the employee an extra benefit of $57,000 
per year at age sixty-five (i.e., $120,000 minus $63,000). Such plans are 
often open to any employee who is participating in a qualified defined 
benefit plan and is making more than $210,000 per year. 
NQDC can operate in a similar, but more elective, fashion when 
employees maximize their elective deferrals to a 401(k) plan. For year 2005, 
the limit on 401(k) contributions is $14,000.182 An employer might allow an 
employee who hits this limit to defer extra amounts to an NQDC plan, which 
might mirror the 401 (k) plan. Such plans are often open to all employees 
who maximize their 401 (k) contributions. 
So, NQDC cannot solely be a special perk reserved for the top five or ten 
executives of a company. Rather, it is often given to all employees who make 
more than $210,000 per year. The lack of participation by lower-paid 
employees is easily explainable by the top hat restrictions of ERISA. The 
active participation by the top five executives is easily explainable by the 
deduction rules of Code§ 162(m). 
In summary, NQDC can be best explained by tax efficiency or business 
necessity. If it were solely a rent-seeking device, participation in such plans 
would not be so wide. Removing the tax incentives for NQDC should be the 
focus of reform, as discussed in the next two sections. 
C. First Best: Putting Deferred Compensation on the Accrual Method 
One fact is indispensable to the current taxation ofNQDC-an unfunded 
promise to pay cash in the future is not considered "property."183 Thus, it is 
beyond the reach of Code § 83 and the economic benefit doctrine. From this 
point, taxpayers can navigate the weaker doctrine of constructive receipt by 
ensuring the executive does not have too much control. Code § 409A maps 
this region with new clarity. 
Professor Daniel Halperin has criticized possible accrual taxation of 
NQDC on two grounds. First, benefits might never be paid even though the 
182 See I.R.C. § 402(g)(l)(B) (2000). 
183 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (2005) ("For purposes of section 83 and the 
regulations thereunder, the tenn 'property' includes real and personal property other than 
either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the 
future."); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. 
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executive was taxed. This could occur if the plan had forfeitures based on 
mortality or if the employer goes bankrupt. Second, accrual taxation would 
lead to income bunching in the year when earned. 
NQDC is essentially a security of the corporate employer. Despite the 
executives' views on the matter, losses on NQDC should be treated like any 
other investment loss. This is a significant but surmountable problem. 
Suppose that an employer makes an unsecured promise to pay a fifty-five 
year-old employee a benefit of $100,000 per year for life starting at age 
sixty-five. Assume that the present value of this promise is determined to be 
$500,000. 184 At the 35% rate, this leads to tax of $175,000. It is possible, 
then, for the employee to pay tax without receiving any benefits if he dies 
before reaching age sixty-five. The same is true if his employer goes 
bankrupt and fails to pay any benefits. Recognition of a deductible loss 
would be in order in either case. Where the employer goes bankrupt, the 
employee could probably take a loss deduction under Code § 165.185 The 
employee's estate might have difficulty claiming a deduction if the employee 
died prematurely because the risk of forfeiture upon death was part of the 
bargain. 186 
Of course, allowing a deduction upon loss does not keep the executive 
whole. Suppose that the executive includes $500,000 in income in 2005 but 
deducts $500,000 in 2010 because of the employer's bankruptcy. One might 
initially object that the executive has given the government an interest-free 
loan for five years but has received nothing of value in the end. The 
184 I arbitrarily valued the benefits using an interest rate of 7% and the mortality 
assumption under I.R.C. § 415 (2000). The result was $502,946. Using statutory 
mortality and interest assumptions in effect in August 2004, I valued the benefit at 
$687,925.72. Cf Rev. Rul. 2001-62, 2001-2 C.B. 632 (setting forth "applicable mortality 
table"); I.R.S. Notice 2004-56, IR-2004-35 (Aug. 30, 2004) (setting forth "applicable 
interest rate" of 5.16% for August 2004). These mortality and interest assumptions are 
most often used to calculate the value of lump-sum distributions from qualified defmed 
benefit plans. See I.R.C. § 417(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-l(d)(l) (2005). The 
interest rate, based on thirty-year Treasury securities, is particularly inappropriate in 
valuing nonqualified benefits. Qualified defined benefit plans are irrevocably funded and 
insured by the government. Neither of these facts is true for deferred compensation. A 
higher interest rate would be needed to reflect the risk involved with nonqualified 
deferred compensation. 
185 This deduction would not be subject to the two-percent floor or phase out. See 
I.R.C. § § 67(b)(3), 68(c)(3) (2000). 
186 See Rev. Rul. 72-193, 1972-1 C.B. 58. Two issues would bear on deductibility if 
payments end on death. First, if the deferred compensation plan were taxed as an annuity 
contract under§ 72, a deduction would be allowed under§ 72(b)(3). Second, if cessation 
were considered a "loss", it might be deductible under§ 16S(a). 
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executive (or his heirs) would certainly feel that way. 187 Yet, the treatment 
would be the same if the executive purchased any other investment asset that 
later became worthless. 
The other criticism of the accrual approach is the bunching of income. 188 
In other words, executives are being taxed on more income in the years when 
they earn it. This critique essentially condones the income averaging 
elements of NQDC. A large part of this Article, however, has argued that 
income averaging is the most significant problem with NQDC and should be 
banished from the tax laws. 
Taxing the unfunded promise to pay as property would solve most of the 
tax problems described above. NQDC generates tax savings to the parties 
because it exploits falling individual rates, rising corporate rates, and 
different rates between corporations and individuals. These problems can be 
traced to the fact that the law allows for deferred taxation on current 
compensation. 
It need not be so. Unlike stock options, NQDC does not have any 
particularly controversial issues of public accounting. Even though the 
employer defers its tax deduction and actual payment, it must take a current 
charge to earnings as NQDC benefits are earned. Interest credited to the 
executives is a charge as well, offset by any interest earned by the employer 
in funding the arrangement. 189 
The Code even contains a system for taxing NQDC on an accrual basis. 
While the income tax defers taxation, the Federal Insurance Contributions 
Act (FICA) 190 does not. 191 FICA levies taxes to fund the Social Security and 
Medicare frograms. The Social Security tax is 6.2% of wages payable by the 
employer1 2 and by the employee. 193 (That is, each pays a 6.2% tax.) Wages 
above the wage base ($90,000 in 2005) 194 are exempt from the Social 
Security tax. 195 The Medicare tax is 1.45% of wages payable by the 
187 Cf Halperin, supra note 83, at 541 ("[E]mployees might find it difficult to 
understand why they should be taxed on money that they may never receive.") 
188 See Halperin, supra note 83, at 542. 
189 See id. at 186-87. 
190 I.R.C. § § 3121-28 (2000). 
191 See Treas. Reg. § 31.312l(v)(2)-l (2005) (applying FICA to deferred 
compensation); Treas. Reg. § 3l.3306(r)(2)-l (2005) (applying FUTA to deferred 
compensation). For a description of these regulations, see generally Dean R. Morley, 
Final Regulations on FICA and FUTA Taxation ofNonqualified Deferred Compensation, 
in N.Y.U. FIFTY-EIGHTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, ch. 2 (2000). 
t92J.R.C. § 3lll(a) (2000). 
t93J.R.C. § 310l(a) (2000). 
194 Rev. Rul. 2004-104, 2004-461.R.B. 837. 
195 I.R.C. § 312l(a)(l) (2000). 
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employer196 and by the employee. 197 (Again, each pays a 1.45% tax.) The 
Medicare tax applies to all wages without limit. 198 
NQDC is subject to FICA taxation when the benefits are no longer 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 199 This is essentially an accrual 
system, with the existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture following Code 
§ 83.200 Only the initial grant ofNQDC is subject to FICA taxation. Earnings 
attributable to a previously taxed grant are exempt. 
Because of immediate taxation and the wage base, deferred 
compensation enjoys a de facto exemption from the 6.2% Social Security tax. 
For example, suppose that an executive earns $500,000 in 2005, and defers 
$100,000 of it to 2015. Only $90,000 is subject to the Social Security tax in 
2005. When the deferred compensation is paid in 2015, it will not be subject 
to Social Security tax then either (whether or not the executive has any other 
income). 
Thus, the only relevant employment tax is the 1.45% Medicare tax. 
Suppose that an executive defers $100,000 in 2005, payable in 2015 with 7% 
annual interest. The $100,000 will be subject to Medicare tax in 2005. The 
7% earnings, however, will not be taxed in 2005, 2015, or any other year.201 
The FICA regulations are a starting point for income taxation, but there 
would need to be some mechanism for taxing earnings. As noted above, the 
FICA regulations tax the base amount of NQDC when it is initially earned. 
Any earnings on the base amount are not themselves subject to FICA tax. 
The most obvious type of earnings is an investment return. If an account with 
$100,000 is established and pays a reasonable amount of interest (say, five 
percent), then the account generates $5,000 of income in the first year. 
Another type (less obvious and less frequent) is mortality gains. Suppose the 
NQDC promise is to pay an annuity of $100,000 per year at age sixty-five 
but to pay nothing if the executive dies before that time. The initial promise 
must be discounted to reflect mortality risk and the time value of money.Z02 
Each year that passes will increase the value of the promise because both 
discounts will decrease. 
196 I.R.C. § 3lll(b)(6) (2000). 
197I.R.C. § 310l{b)(6) (2000). 
198 See Treas. Reg.§ 1.312l{v)(2)-l{d)(l) (2005) ("However, because there is no 
wage base limitation for the HI portion of FICA for years after 1993, the entire amount 
deferred (in addition to all other wages) is subject to the HI tax for the year and, thus, will 
not be considered taken into account for purposes of this section unless the HI tax 
relating to the amount deferred is actually paid."). 
199 See Treas. Reg. § 31.312l(v)(2)-l(a)(2)(ii) (2005). 
200seeTreas. Reg.§ 31.312l(v)(2)-l(a)(3)(2005). 
201 See Treas. Reg. § 31.312l(v)(2)-l{a)(2){iii) (2005). 
202 See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121 (v)(2)-l (c)(2)(ii)(2005). 
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Here are three plausible means to tax earnings on NQDC under a system 
of accrual taxation: 
Mark-to-market taxation. All gains or losses, whether realized or not, on 
NQDC would be reflected in income every year. This mark-to-market system 
is often thought of as an ideal system of taxation, but it is rare in the Code. 203 
One might legitimately claim that such a system would disadvantage NQDC, 
because other investments by the executive are not subject to mark-to-market 
taxation. 
Deferred taxation. If NQDC is paid in a lump sum, then the reformed 
Code could simply tax the executive on the total amount received minus the 
amount previously subject to tax. This would give the executive "basis" or 
"investment in the contract" of the initial grant. Problems arise if NQDC is 
paid in installments. One method would be to tax the executive only after the 
basis or investment in the contract has been fully recovered. Suppose that the 
initial grant was $100,000, but that the executive will ultimately receive ten 
payments of$15,000 each. The first six payments would be received tax free. 
Of the seventh payment, $10,000 would not be taxed. The rest of the seventh 
payment ($5,000), along with the eighth, ninth, and tenth would be fully 
taxed. 
Ratable recovery. The method just described applied to annuity contracts 
before 1934.204 Since then, annuitants recover basis ratably. In the example 
just given, the executive would recover $10,000 of his or her investment in 
the contract upon each $15,000 payment.205 
Such would be the treatment if the corporation had transferred a 
commercial annuity to the executive rather than making the NQDC promise. 
The executive would pay tax on the value of the annuity when it becomes 
substantially vested.206 However, the employee would pay no further tax on 
the annuity until payments commence. Future payments under the contract 
are, in part, financed by income that the insurer receives on the initial 
purchase price.207 Future payments may also be financed, in part, by the 
forfeitures of other annuity holders who suffer early deaths. Once payments 
start, the annuitant/executive is taxed on these gains. The annuitant/executive 
must also be allowed to recover his or her "investment in the contract" (i.e., 
203 See e.g., I.R.C. § 475 (2000) (mark-to-market accounting for securities dealers); 
I.R.C. § 402(b) (2000) (mark-to-market accounting for disqualified employee trust). 
204 See BITIKER & LoKKEN, supra note 15, at para. 12.3.1. 
205 See I.R.C. § 72 (2000); See BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, at para. 12.3.2. 
206 See I.R.C § 403(c) (2000) (applying § 83 principles to the taxation of 
nonqualified annuities); supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text (discussing § 83 
principles). 
207 But cf I.R.C. § 72(u) (2000) (imposing tax on the income associated with 
annuity contracts owned by policy holders who are not natural persons). 
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previously taxed amounts). Allocating payments between gams and 
investment in the contract is the province of Code § 72. 
A remaining obstacle to accrual taxation is assigning a current value to 
the NQDC promise. Actuarial principles solve some of this when the 
problem is valuing mortality risks and the like. The biggest problem, 
however, is the credit risk of the employer. Deferral with a small, shaky 
company is different from deferral with a Fortune 100 giant. Voluntary 
deferrals might signal the value. Treating voluntary deferrals differently 
reintroduces the problems of the 1978 proposed regulations discussed above. 
The FICA regulations essentially value unsecured promises to pay at 
their face value. The error might be acceptable in the FICA context because 
the rate oftaxation is so low. And, maybe it is acceptable in income taxation 
as well, particularly since taxation on earnings would likely be deferred. The 
problem might disappear, however, under a system of current taxation. 
Executives and employers may well look to irrevocably funded 
arrangements. There is no reason to discourage such arrangements, and they 
should not be subject to the burdensome double taxation under current law as 
described below.208 
A final problem would be the treatment ofNQDC under Code§ 162(m), 
which limits compensation deductions to $1 million for the top five 
executives of a public company. Current law allows NQDC to escape these 
limits because payments are made in the future, after the executive is no 
longer employed (and no longer part of the top five group). How would Code 
§ 162(m) apply under an accrual system? The issue is what one thinks of 
Code § 162(m), not what one thinks of NQDC. A supporter of Code 
§ 162(m) would likely embrace accrual taxation as it would make avoidance 
even harder. An opponent would likely want, at a minimum, to retain the 
status quo and allow NQDC to escape the limits of Code § 162(m). NQDC 
reform could accommodate either position. 
In summary, NQDC can and should be taxed on a current basis. The 
most significant difficulties would be taxing earnings on the initial award of 
NQDC and actually valuing the award. These difficulties should be 
surmountable. If they prove too difficult politically, an effective second best 
solution might be in order. 
D. Second Best: Taxing Executive at Highest Marginal Rate for 
Individuals 
A simple, second best solution would curtail many of the advantages of 
NQDC. This is taxing NQDC at the highest marginal rates that apply to 
208 See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text. 
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individuals. Recall that NQDC has three possible tax advantages: shifting 
individual income to low-tax years, shifting corporation deductions to high 
tax years, and shifting investment taxation from individuals to corporations. 
The structure of the Code suggests that the first of these advantages is 
probably the most serious.209 
Such an approach has precedence where income shifting is problematic. 
Under the so-called kiddie tax,210 a child under age fourteen must pay tax on 
unearned income at his or her parents' rate. The kiddie tax was enacted to 
curtail income shifting from high-bracket parents to low-bracket children.211 
Another example is the drastically compressed tax brackets that apply to non-
grantor trusts. Married couples filing jointly reach the maximum rate of 35% 
only after they reach $326,450 of income. Trusts, however, are subject to the 
maximum rate after they reach only $9,750 ofincome.212 Similarly, the Code 
imposes a special tax on personal holding companies, which are 
"corporations controlled by a small number of individuals and deriving 
prescribed percentages of their income from specified, mostly passive 
sources."213 The purpose of these special rules is to curtail income shifting 
from high-bracket individuals to low-bracket entities. 
A tentative concern might be the blanket application of the highest 
marginal rate regardless of the personal situation of the executive receiving 
benefits. This concern was obviously overcome in the trust context. In the 
NQDC context, ERISA effectively limits participation to highly compensated 
employees. Under 2005 rates, the 33% bracket applies to a married-filing-
jointly couple with more than $182,800.214 Anyone with less taxable income 
than that is questionable as an NQDC participant.215 
Some might complain that such a special tax generates more complexity. 
NQDC is already complicated, and a special tax would put less pressure on 
administering the complexities of Code § 409A, the constructive receipt 
doctrine, and the economic benefit doctrine. A principled complaint should 
209 Analyzing NQDC empirically is difficult. Before 2005, employers reported 
distributions to employees on boxes 1 and II of IRS Form W-2. However, there was no 
designation for accruals. The accruals should have been reported as Medicare wages on 
box 5, but would have been excluded from the definition of taxable wages on box l. 
Other items, such as 401(k) contributions, would be in box 5 but not box I. 
210 I.R.C. § l(g) (2000). 
211 See STAFF OF TIIE J. CoMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OFTIIE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 1253-55 (Comrn. Print. 1987). 
212 I.R.C. § 1(e) (2000); Rev. Proc. 2004-71, supra note 98, at§ 3.01. 
213 BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, at~ 99.2.1. 
214 See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, supra note 98, § 3.01. 
215 Certification by the Social Security Administration should be a prerequisite to 
avoid manipulation. 
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lead one to conclude, however, that accrual taxation is the best system-
particularly because it already exists for employment taxation. One unwilling 
to embrace the first best because of perceived harshness should not have 
standing to reject the second best because of any complexity. 
Another concern might be that such a special tax could be more 
burdensome than accrual taxation. Suppose a plausible case in which the 
falling rates faced by an individual are offset by the higher tax on 
investments paid by the corporation. Under current law, NQDC might be tax 
neutral. Imposing the special tax would disadvantage NQDC when compared 
with current compensation. A possible solution to this problem would be to 
allow the parties to elect either accrual taxation (i.e., the first best) or 
deferred taxation at the highest rate (i.e, the second best). Something like this 
election exists in the taxation of property transfers under Code§ 83(b)?16 
Even under current law, the parties will occasionally forgo tax deferral 
and more fully secure the benefits. This can be done with a "secular trust." 
(The name and purpose of the rabbi trust are inverted.) Assets of the secular 
trust cannot be reached by the employer's creditors.217 The employee, 
however, will be subject to immediate taxation when amounts are credited to 
him or her under the NQDC plan (even though actual payment will be 
deferred). The employer will receive an immediate deduction for these 
amounts. 
The taxation of contributions to a secular trust is sensible. The executive 
has recognized taxable income under the economic benefit doctrine. Because 
of this recognition, the corporation should be entitled to take an immediate 
tax deduction. There are two more elements beyond the taxation of 
contributions: taxation of earnings to the trust and taxation of distributions to 
the corporation. Technical problems in the Code, exacerbated by the IRS 
ruling positions, complicate these elements. 
Executives are taxed on earnings and appreciation (both realized and 
unrealized) held in the trust on a mark-to-market basis.218 So, unrealized 
216 See I.R.C. § 83(b) (2000). But cf Treas. Reg. § l.83-7(a) (2005) (preventing 
employee stock options from being subject to such an election). 
217 Although the secular trust might be exempt from the employer's creditors, it 
might be subject to the employee's creditors depending on the format used. An employer-
settled secular trust would likely be subject to the spendthrift provisions of ERISA. See 
ERISA § 206(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2005) ("Each pension plan shall provide that 
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."). An employee-
settled secular trust might not be subject to ERISA at all. SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 
41, § 8.04[2][c][ii]. Rather, state trust law might preclude effective protection against the 
employee's creditors. 
218 I.R.C. § 402(b)(4)(A) (2000). Section 402(b)(4)(A) applies only to trusts that fail 
to satisfy the nondiscrimination rules of§ 410(b) or § 40l(a)(26). Because they benefit 
HeinOnline -- 67 Ohio St. L.J. 398 2006
398 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:347 
capital appreciation would be taxed to the employee at ordinary tax rates. 
This extraordinary treatment would not occur if the executive owned the 
assets directly or if the trust were taxed under the rules that usually apply to 
private trusts.219 
Mark-to-market treatment should be more than enough income tax. But, 
the Code does not stop there.220 Because the trust is a separate taxable entity, 
it will pay tax on realized income as well. 221 This second level oftaxation can 
be avoided if the trust pays its income to the executive annually because the 
trust can deduct its "distributable net income. "222 
All of these problems could be solved rather elegantly by recourse to the 
trust-taxation rules under subchapter J.223 As under current law, a corporation 
that contributes to a nongrantor trust would get an immediate deduction for 
the contribution, and the executive would have income. The corporation 
should have no more connection to the taxation of the trust. After the 
contribution, undistributed trust income should be taxed to the trust, and 
distributed trust income should be taxed to the executive. Subchapter J would 
work well in taxing funded executive compensation because it was designed 
to prevent income shifting in the first place. 
In summary, most of the gains from accrual taxation could be obtained 
by allowing tax deferral but taxing the executive at the highest marginal 
rates. Such an approach would largely keep intact the current regime of 
taxation, but would reduce the costs of income shifting. The approach could 
even be elective, with a choice between it and full accrual taxation. The 
approach has precedence with the kiddie tax and subchapter J. Indeed, 
only highly-compensated employees, executive pension plans would always fail at least 
§ 410(b). 
219 Mark-to-market treatment might be justifiable as the way to tax all investment 
earnings. See, e.g., David Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual 
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986). 1n addition, the application ofthe 10% penalty 
tax on early distributions and the basis recovery rules under § 72 remains unsettled. See 
SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra note 41, § 8.04[2}[c][i][B] . 
220 The relevant IRS rulings are I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-17-013 (Jan. 24, 1994); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-02-017 (Oct. 15, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-12-024 (Dec. 20, 
1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-12-019 (Dec. 20, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-07-010 
(Nov. 12, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-06-009 (Nov. 11, 1991). 
221 I.R.C. § 641 (2000). 
222 I.R.C. § § 643(a), 651, 661 (2000). Annual payment of income obviously 
frustrates the economic purpose of deferred compensation. 
223 Taxpayers sometimes structure arrangements where the executive constructively 
or actually receives compensation but contributes it to a trust. This state of affairs 
removes the trust from taxation under § 402(b ). Instead, the trust is disregarded as a 
grantor trust, and the executive is taxed on its income directly. SIRKIN & CAGNEY, supra 
note 41, § 8.04[2)[c][i][C]; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48-015 (Aug. 29, 1995); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.402(b)-l(b)(6) (2005). 
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subchapter J itself should be the regime for taxing fully funded NQDC 
benefits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
NQDC needs reform, as it allows for deferred taxation on current 
compensation. Executives (with the help of their employers) can shift 
taxation from high-tax earning years to low-tax retirement years. High-tax 
executives may also have the opportunity to shift investment income to their 
low-tax employers. Thus, the choice between payment today and payment in 
the future is distorted by the implicit (and potentially costly) tax benefits. 
Unfortunately, the reforms of Code § 409A were the product of new 
corporate scandals and old tax doctrines. The result might make deferring the 
receipt of compensation somewhat less palatable for executives because they 
face stricter limits on their security and control. Those executives and 
corporations who still choose to defer receipt of compensation will face the 
same economics and taxation as before. 
Full reform would recognize that NQDC is simply property, a security in 
the corporation. The executive performs services for this security rather than 
for current compensation. Thus, full reform would require that the executive 
be taxed when NQDC is earned, rather than when cash payments are made. 
A second best reform would allow for tax deferral but would tax the ultimate 
payments at the highest marginal rate. Such a regime would eliminate the 
problem of shifting compensation from high-tax earning years to low-tax 
retirement years. Moreover, such a regime is similar to others that prevent 
income shifting (such as the kiddie tax and the compressed rate schedules 
that apply to trusts). 
